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ABSTRACT
Vietnam and the More Flags Campaign, 1964-1965:
The Search for American Allies
In the Commonwealth

by
Becky L. Bruce
Dr. Joseph A. Fry, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In April 1964, the United States initiated the More Flags campaign in an attempt to
establish a western coalition force and diplomatic support system for the South
Vietnamese government and for American intervention against the North. Three of the
most heavily courted nations were the Commonwealth members of Australia, Great
Britain, and Canada. This first in-depth study of this diplomatic effort and the
comparative response of these Commonwealth nations provides insight into the U.S.
efforts at coalition building, the essentially unilateralist and nationalist nature of U.S.
foreign policy, and the varying U.S. relationships with these three important members of
the western diplomatic alliance at this stage of the Cold War. It exposed America’s
declining relationship with Britain and the shifting reliance of the middle powered
Commonwealth members away from Britain toward the United States.
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CHAPTER 1

UNITED STATES SEARCH FOR MORE FLAGS
In an April 23, 1964, press conference. President Lyndon B. Johnson said that he
hoped the United States would see more flags in Vietnam in a united effort to stop the
spread of communism in A sia/ This simple statement was a public acknowledgement of
a new State Department policy that became increasingly important as the United States
intensified its involvement in the war. The policy known as the more flags campaign was
launched by the State Department in April 1964 and continued through July 1965 when
America officially committed combat troops for an offensive war in Vietnam in the hope
o f bolstering support for the Saigon Government and increasing allied aid for American
action against the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam.
Among the most important flags being courted were the Commonwealth countries
Britain, Australia and Canada. These traditional allies had mixed responses to the
conflict. Australia was greatly concerned with communist aggression in Southeast Asia
and quickly became a vocal advocate of US intervention. Britain was heavily committed
in Malaysia and the Middle East and felt that Vietnam was of little economic and
strategic significance. London was fearful that Western action in mainland Southeast
Asia would spark Soviet or Chinese intervention, which could lead to a larger conflict.

’ The Johnson Presidential Press Conferences, intro by Doris Keams Goodwin (2 vols; New York: Earl M.
Coleman Enterprises, Inc., 1978), I, 102-105.
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Canada was caught in the middle. As a member of the International Control Commission
(ICC), established to oversee the implementation of the Geneva Agreement o f 1954,
Canada could not commit to any military action.
Set on the uncertain stage of the Cold War, the United States believed it could neither
afford to lose the political support of its Commonwealth allies nor risk military credibility
by losing Vietnam to the Communists. The Johnson Administration began the more flags
policy to address this problem by acquiring increased support for American actions in
Vietnam. Much emphasis was placed on alliance building based on the idea o f mutual
security needs and geopolitical stability. However, while advocating a multilateral,
mutual defense strategy for Southeast Asia, Johnson was actually practicing a unilateral,
interventionist policy that placed US nationalist interests above international
considerations. The President had little regard for international organizations such as the
UN, for international agreements, such as the Geneva Agreement of 1954, when they did
not serve US purposes, or for international cooperation that infringed on US objectives.^
This foreign policy approach reflected Washington’s indifference to mutuality o f interests
and helped precipitate the shifting alliances within the Commonwealth.
The results of the more flags campaign reflected the impact that the Vietnam War had
on America’s relations with the Commonwealth members and on the Commonwealth
relationship itself. Most of the historical literature on America’s relationship with the
Commonwealth members has been written from a bi-lateral perspective, focusing on
Australian and Canadian reliance on either Britain or the United States and British

^ Joseph A. Fry, Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations. 1789-1973 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 222-23, 294-97.
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dependence on American backing, but rarely looking at the Commonwealth as a whole
and the war’s impact.
Historian Coral Bell contends that following World War II Australia found itself in a
triangular relationship with Britain and the United States in which it was regarded as a
minor power relying heavily on Britain and then America for security. Australia’s
traditional, automatic and unconditional mutual defense alliance with Britain was
destroyed when World War II cast British reliability in a major war into question.
Australian security reliance began to waver between America and the Britain in the two
decades following the war until the economic struggles and communist threat o f the
1960s pushed Australia toward Washington. The final shift in Australian security
alliances came during the more flags campaign when American stopped viewing
Australia as a minor power and began to consider it a middle power ally.^
Similarly, Gregory Pemberton asserts that after 1945, because o f Britain’s decline and
the perceived Communist threat in Asia, successive Australian governments sought to
align themselves with the United States in international policies. Washington was
receptive because by the 1960s, the “need of the United States to conduct its policies
within a multilateral framework was reciprocated by its allies need for security.”
Australia’s involvement in Vietnam was the product of these mutual interests."*
Canada also experienced a shifting international position. John H. Thompson and
Stephen J. Randal maintain that from the end of World War II through the 1950s, as
Canada initiated an independent foreign policy from the Commonwealth, Washington

^ Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press
Ausbalia, 1988), 1-6.
Gregory Pemberton, All tbe Wav: Ausbalia’s Road to Vietnam (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987), xi-xiv.
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and Ottawa established many “bilateral institutions and mechanisms” based on
“economic interest and shared assumptions about the nature of the world and their
responsibilities within it.” By the 1960s, however, different approaches to economic,
cultural and defense policies began to fragment the relationship. Canada began to seek “a
global ‘third option’ that could increase its independence of the United States.”^
While agreeing that Canada wanted to increase its independence from the United
States in the 1960s, Greg Donaghy asserts that Ottawa sought only political and military
and not economic independence. Canada actually developed a policy o f “economic
integration and political differentiation” toward Washington. The intent was to address
its economic weaknesses by shifting from its traditional Commonwealth trading structure
to a unilateral approach to the United States while still remaining politically independent
o f Washington by adopting “new military and diplomatic roles” that were “designed to
reflect a unique perspective on international affairs.”^
Much has been written on Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States and
London’s shifting reliance between America and Europe. Craig Wilson argues in his
article “Rhetoric, Reality and Dissent: The Vietnam Policy of the British Labour
Government, 1964-1970” that in refusing to commit troops to Vietnam while pursuing
peace initiatives, the ultimate goal of Prime Minister Wilson was to preserve the special
relationship. Ultimately, however, Wilson made no fundamental changes in the nature of

^ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (Athens:
The University o f Georgia Press, 2002), 6-7.
®Greg Donaghy, Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States 1963-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2002), 1-6.
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the alliance and the British government became a “captive supporter” of US policy
decisions/
Chris Wrigley provides a directly contrary interpretation in his article “Now you see
it, now you don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s foreign policy, 1964-1970.” Wrigley
contends that Wilson’s decision to intervene in the peace process was solely an attempt to
establish himself as a statesman. The Prime Minister’s actions were not a conscious
assertion o f independence from the “special relationship,” but rather the event proved to
the Prime Minister and the British government that the United States had already begun
to move away from the old alliance. It was not until after 1967 and the failure of W ilson’s
mediation that the British Government recognized that it could not reestablish the long
standing US-British ties.*
Brian White adds to the historiographical complexity by arguing that the party’s
Vietnam policy was not a break with the United States but was in fact an attempt to
regain the relationship that had already been lost in 1959. In his article, “The decline of
British influence on East-West Relations,” White maintains that the real turning point in
the demise of the “special relationship” came in the 1959 Camp David summit between
President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev which established a legitimate protocol
for direct negotiations between the superpowers, thus removing the need for the third
party intermediary Great Britain. The Vietnam War offered an opportunity for Great
Britain to reestablish its special relationship by reinserting London into détente

’ Craig Wilson, “Rhetoric, Reality, and Dissent: The Vietnam Policy o f the British Labour Government,
1964-1970.” The Social Science Journal Vol. 23, Num. 1, (1986), 17-31.
* Chris Wrigley, “N ow You See It, N ow You D on’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s Foreign Policy 1964-70”,
in The Wilson Government 1964-1970. ed. R Loopey & S. Fielding. (London: Printer Publishers, 1993),
23-35.
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diplomacy through mediating an end to the war. By accomplishing this, England hoped to
regain its status as a Cold War arbitrator.^
All of these assessments are based in a bi-lateral approach to American relations
with the United States and neglect the impact by and on the Commonwealth relationship.
By using a multilateral approach to examine the American relations with the
Commonwealth, the more flags campaign reveals a growing rift within the
Commonwealth itself, and changing attitudes of each member toward its American ally.
During the 1960s, there was a re-alignment among the Commonwealth members. As
British disillusionment with the United States deepened, London moved its diplomatic
position away from America toward the European community. Australia and Canada
were ultimately forced to reassess the utility of the Commonwealth relationship and their
economic and military reliance on the United Kingdom. Both began to see the United
States as a far more reliable friend. At the same time, the United States faced a growing
foreign policy crisis that forced Washington to shift its alliance structure to accommodate
the changing international attitudes, especially those of Europe, toward America. Where
traditionally the United States had relied on the United Kingdom as its main ally and had
considered Australia and Canada only minor allies of the Commonwealth, during the
Vietnam War the roles were reversed. Washington became frustrated with England’s lack
o f commitment and learned to appreciate the role of the middle powered countries.
Britain turned its focus toward the European community while Australia and Canada
shifted their security reliance toward the United States. In the end, the more flags

^ Brian White, “The Decline o f the British Influence on East-West Relations,” in Britain. Détente and
Changing East-West Relations (London: Routledge, 1992), 108-09.
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campaign’s lack o f success exposed the growing rift in the American-Commonwealth
alliance and provides useful insight into the process of alliance building.

United States Background to Involvement
To understand why the United States found itself needing to solicit allied help, it is
important to understand the events leading up to April 1964. Following the end of World
War II, the United States faced both the threat of communist aggression and the dilemma
o f how to interact with the post-colonial areas of Asia and Africa. Franklin Delano
Roosevelt had often hinted that he supported complete independence for old colonial
possessions, but by 1949 the Truman administration had to face the very real threat that
international communists could take advantage of the vulnerable governments and
economies of the newly independent nations. In response, the Truman administration
chose to support French reoccupation of colonial territories in Southeast Asia. The
decision was made out o f a fear that weakening and alienating the European allies was far
more detrimental to world security than upsetting third world areas that played a far less
significant role in the world capitalist economy. While the decision upset the people of
these less-developed countries, most notably the Vietnamese, Washington believed
supporting French reoccupation was the best alternative at the time.
Once the Soviets had successfully detonated their first atomic bomb and Mao Zedong
and the Chinese Communists prevailed in the Chinese civil war in 1949, Washington
turned to an almost zealous stance against communist expansion and began using its
economic and military abilities to back virtually any non-communist area under threat.
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By the early 1950s the United States became committed to stopping the communist
insurgency in Indochina. While unwilling to commit military support to Southeast Asia,
Washington diplomatically and financially invested in French Indochina with the intent
of reinforcing the pro-western French presence on the mainland for as long as possible.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 again drew attention to East Asia and
reinforced America’s fear o f the communist threat to the newly de-colonized areas of the
world. The United States began to search for ways to strengthen the west’s presence in
these more vulnerable areas. It was decided that Japan was too great an asset to the
western powers and too close to the communist threat to leave it in its vulnerable, post
war condition. Japan was a major Asian industrial power; was strategically vital to trade
routs in the Pacific, especially the Asian market; and from its location, could be used to
threaten either the United States or the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned
a re-militarized Japan that could be used by the Western alliance against the Soviet and
Chinese threat. The State Department, under Secretary Dean Acheson, believed that
economic recovery coupled with a series o f American military bases in Japan was the
best solution. The United States decided that the only way to ensure a pro-western Japan
would be to allow it to rebuild its economy and to militarily safeguard the island against
the Soviet and Chinese threat.*®
The greatest resistance to this objective, however, came from America’s
Commonwealth allies in the region. The memory of Japanese aggression in World War II
was still fresh in the minds of Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. They
disagreed with the leniency o f Washington’s proposed treaty and strongly supported a

Michael Schaller, The American Occupation o f Japan: The Origins o f the Cold War in Asia (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985), 164-77.
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firmer, more restraining settlement. All three were still greatly concerned with their own
security in the region and wanted assurances in the form of treaty agreements with the
United States guaranteeing American protection and assistance in their own strategic
objectives. As a result, Washington agreed to the Australian, New Zealand and United
States treaty (ANZUS) in 1951 which provided for consultation between the signatories in
the event o f a threat to any member and declared that the parties would “act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional process.”*' While ANZUS had no
provisions for military planning and remained only a civilian consultative body, the
agreement laid the foundation for Australia’s heavy reliance on American military
support in its future external policies. This reliance left Australia obligated to the United
States when it intervened against the communists in Vietnam.*^
The United States originally favored a single multi-national pact including Japan, the
Philippines and possibly Indonesia along with Australia and New Zealand and excluding
any military commitments on the Asian mainland. By offering security to all four,
Washington would create an offshore, pro-western barrier défendable by air and sea
power. Ultimately, the United States could not get all four to agree to enter into alliances
with each other and instead chose to enter separate treaties with Japan and the
Philippines.*^
The United States did not want Britain involved in the Southeast Asian treaty system
because of British commitments to the Asian mainland in Hong Kong and Malaysia.
" Howard Jones, The Course o f American Diplomacy (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), 521; Department o f
State, “ANZUS Treaty,” American Foreign Policy 1950-1955. vol. I (Washington, D C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1957), 878-880.
Jones, Course o f American Diplomacy. 521.
Ibid.; Pemberton, Australia’s Road to Vietnam. 25.
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Washington feared that British commitment to the South Pacific region could lead
America into an unwanted intervention on the Southeast Asian mainland.*"* Britain
opposed ANZUS because o f its exclusion from the strategic decision making involving
two of its commonwealth members. The British feared the treaty could lead to a possible
military altercation that would force the United Kingdom participation through its
commonwealth ties.
On September 1, 1951, the ANZUS treaty was signed. Australia saw the treaty as
proof of its “special relationship” with America and began to shift its strategic alignment
more heavily toward the United States. For Washington, the treaty had far less
significance. The United States was more concerned with creating a global alliance of
which ANZUS was only a small and somewhat insignificant part. To the United States,
ANZUS was more a political gesture to ensure a lenient treaty for Japan, which was far
more important to Washington’s global plan. In the end, the treaty proved more important
to America than anticipated. As US involvement in Vietnam increased and international
opposition heightened, one of the few sources of encouragement came from the ANZUS
members.*^
When, in early 1954, the French found themselves trapped at the battle of Dien Bien
Phu and requested that Vietnamese peace negotiations become a priority at the upcoming
Geneva convention, Washington scrambled to shore up allied support for future US
action in the event that the French withdrew from Vietnam. President Dwight D.
Eisenhower initiated discussions of a possible “united action” to save the French position.
Many factors had to coincide before the United States could act. If France agreed to
Bell, A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. 48.
Pemberton, Australia’s Road to Vietnam. 27-30.
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internationalize the conflict, the United States would commit to action when it had the
full support o f its allies. When approached about a united action, America’s allies,
especially Great Britain, refused to act before the Geneva talks had been exhausted.
Based on the lack o f enthusiastic support, Eisenhower tabled the idea of intervention until
after the Geneva Conference and instead took the opportunity to strengthen the security
treaty system with US Commonwealth allies in Southeast Asia.*®
The Manila Conference of September 8, 1954, proved the opportunity Washington
needed to gain a multilateral security treaty for Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created in Manila by the United States, Great Britain,
France, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, Pakistan and India. The
signatories agreed to a mutual defense of “the general area o f Southeast Asia” in the
event of “aggression by means of armed attack” or if the territorial sovereignty o f any
state within the Treaty Area was threatened “in any way other than armed attack.” While
the language was strong, the treaty did not provide for military commitment and only
required each signatory to respond to aggression in “accordance with its constitutional
process.” The treaty was the culmination of America’s desire to contain Chinese
communist aggression by creating an island-chain barrier of pro-western allies off
Southeast Asia. It proposed to build a strong coalition by assisting member countries with
military development, increased economic stability, and strategic protection. The treaty
established a counsel to consult on military matters as they arose. Most importantly, with
this treaty the United States finally had a multilateral security alliance that would

Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 40-51. For
Eisenhower’s account o f Dien Bien Phu and united action see, Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Eisenhower
Diaries, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), 274-84.
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ostensibly ensure allied assistance in the event that Washington found itself in conflict
with the communists in Southeast Asia.
The ANZUS and SEATO treaties provided the technical rationale which future US
administrations cited as they became mired in Vietnam without an official declaration of
war. By ratifying both treaties, Congress effectively agreed that in the event of
“aggression by armed attack in the Treaty Area,” the United States would “act to meet the
common danger.”*^ Congress did not readily give up its constitutional right to declare
war, but reluctantly agreed after being assured by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
that the wording of the SEATO treaty was used with the understanding that the President
would come to Congress in case of a threat of danger “unless the emergency were so
great that prompt action were necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.”**
This new treaty system had several effects on Washington’s Southeast Asian policy.
First, the ANZUS treaty created an open relationship with Australia by giving them a
voice in policy planning in Southeast Asia. This new dialogue would allow Australia to
urge the United States toward greater involvement in the region and would enable the
Untied States to pressure Australia toward troop commitment a decade later. Second, the
SEATO Treaty created a multi-lateral security agreement that would be used by
Washington hawks to claim an obligatory involvement in South Vietnam and would lead
Johnson’s staff to a deluded belief that its allies would also assume that obligation and
agree to assist America in the Vietnam conflict.

Department o f State, “ANZUS Treaty,” American Foreign Policy 1950-1955. vol. I (Washington, D C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 878-80.
Department o f State, “Report o f the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” Jan 25, 1955, American
Foreign Policy 1950-1955. vol. I (Washington, D C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 941.
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In July 1954 France began its exit from Vietnam by signing the Geneva Accords.
Vietnam was partitioned and South Vietnam, led by Ngo Dinh Diem, began transitioning
its economic and military reliance away from France toward the United States. With
Washington’s assistance South Vietnam refused to hold the proposed election in 1956 to
reunify the country and Diem began a seven-year campaign of repression in an attempt to
solidify his control o f South Vietnam. For the remainder of the 1950s, the United States
assisted Diem financially and with military advisors to stabilize his control and to resist
internal opposition from the emerging National Liberation Front and its allies in
Communist North Vietnam who pursued reunification with the South.
During this time, Britain and Australia’s attentions turned toward Malaysia and
communist insurgents in Indonesia. Washington encouraged British protection of the
areas but refused any assistance to Malaysia. The United States felt it was Britain’s
responsibility and o f little significance to its own strategy. For Britain, the Vietnam issue
had heen settled at Geneva and Malaysia was now the only obstacle to the United
Kingdom ending all its commitments East of the Suez. For Australia, Malaysia was the
only thing keeping London involved in Southeast Asia and a communist victory in
Vietnam, would leave nothing standing between Australia and Communist China.
While Britain and Australia were concerned with Malaysia, Canada began its almost
twenty-year entanglement in Vietnam. Under the 1954 Geneva Accords, Canada was
appointed a member of the International Control Commission (ICC). The Commission
was charged with supervising the application of the agreement. ICC members were to
oversee the French evacuation from the North and the Viet Minh withdrawal from South
Vietnam hy October 20, 1954, and to ensure the free movement of the civilians who
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wished to evacuate across the Demilitarized Zone at the 17**^ parallel. The Commission
would ensure that civilians and military personnel from both sides were allowed to move
without restriction or violence. Finally, when disputes occurred, the ICC was directed to
investigate the problem and make recommendations for a solution. For the remainder o f
the 1950s, Canada was entangled in this often-ineffectual Commission.'®
In contrast to Canadian peacekeeping efforts in Vietnam, Washington began a policy
of increasing support to Saigon through military advisors and equipment to the South
Vietnamese Army (ARVN) so that by 1963, the United States had 16,000 “advisory”
personnel in South Vietnam. The Kennedy administration was primarily responsible for
the increase in American personnel and was indirectly responsible for the coup that led to
Diem’s assassination in November 1963. Following the coup, a series of new leaders
attempted to govern South Vietnam and to save the country from the National Liberation
Front Viet Cong- a guerrilla insurgency group originally formed to challenge South
Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and who were later supported by the North
Vietnamese Communists. By November 22, 1963, when President John F. Kennedy was
assassinated and Vice President Lyndon Johnson took the oath to become President, the
United States was heavily invested in South Vietnam, the Saigon Government was in
complete disarray, and the international community was begirming to question American
objectives in Vietnam.^®

Paul Bridle, Behind the Headlines: Canada and the International Commission in Indochina. 1954-1972
(Toronto: Canadian Institute o f International Affairs, 1973), 1-7; Edelgard Mahant and Graeme S. Mount,
Invisible and Inaudible in Washington: American Policies Toward Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999),
40-2.
Brain VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation o f the Vietnam War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 4-10.
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Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam
Just two days after Lyndon Johnson became President, he met with his top advisors as
well as US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge and Central Intelligence
Director John McCone for an assessment of the situation in Vietnam. Lodge reported that
since the coup removed Diem, the situation in Saigon had improved and he believed that
new leader Duong Van Minh would “speed up their war efforts.” McCone’s assessment
was more critical of the new Saigon Government. He informed the President o f an
increase in Viet Cong activity since the coup and said that the military leaders under
Minh were disorganized and were having difficulties with civilian leaders. Johnson
decided Washington “had to help the new government get on its feet and perform
effectively.”^'
Johnson then heard a briefing on the Honolulu meeting of Kennedy’s top advisors,
including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and
National Security Adviser MacGeorge Bundy, held days earlier. The discussion was a
“modestly encouraging assessment of prospects in Vietnam.” The participants in the
Honolulu meeting emphasized that it was important to have “a unified [international]
team and that there be the fullest consultation among them.” This was the first mention of
what would become the more flags campaign the following summer.
Starting with the President’s November 26, 1963, decisions to continue with the
Kennedy administration’s Vietnam policies, Johnson firmly set America on a course of
an ever-increasing commitment into a seemingly endless and un-winnable struggle.

Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives o f the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 43-44.
Ibid., 44-45.
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During the first half of 1964, Johnson was hesitant to use American force in Vietnam and
instead chose to increase support for the successive regimes in Saigon and to enlarge the
South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). This hesitation stemmed from the fact that Johnson
knew that any combat commitment would be unpopular. Over the next year, Johnson
hoped to secure congressional approval of his Great Society program and then to get re
elected in the fall. An unpopular war in which the United States had no allies would
threaten those plans. The President knew he needed both to bolster international support
and to devise a strong rationale for action in Vietnam before committing troops. The
problem was most of America’s traditional allies, with the exception of Australia, were
openly opposed to a widening of the conflict and without a strong, stable government in
Saigon, the prospect o f changing any minds seemed grim.
On January 30, 1964, Duong Van Minh was overthrown and the United States was
forced to back yet another government under Major General Nguyen Khanh. Henry
Cabot Lodge was once again optimistic, believing the new leadership was capable o f
turning South Vietnam around. The coup left others in Washington more skeptical of
South Vietnamese viability. The Joint Chiefs wanted to increase the U.S. military
presence in Vietnam and to start cross-border operations in Cambodia. Others, such as
Senator Mike Mansfield, journalist Walter Lippmann, and Senator Wayne Morse were
pushing for negotiations and United Nations assistance.

Johnson held fast to his policy

of support for Saigon because he “thought they needed and deserved understanding and
patience.”^"*

^ William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University
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By March, the President’s patience was ebbing so he decided to send US Ambassador
to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor and Secretary of Defense McNamara to Vietnam to
evaluate the situation. The resulting McNamara-Taylor Report described the deteriorating
situation but rejected the idea of withdrawal. It recommended strengthening the Republic
of South Vietnam (RVN) without sending US combat troops which might trouble
America’s allies. Johnson agreed that the United States should support South Vietnam
and develop a strong military and political base for possible future action.^®
President Johnson was in a precarious position regarding Vietnam. By April 1964, the
Saigon Government had experienced three coups, the South Vietnamese military was
performing badly at best and the North Vietnamese had steadily increased their
infiltration of the south at a very efficient rate. In most situations, these negative aspects,
coupled with the lack o f any readily apparent economic or strategic significance of South
Vietnam to the United States would have turned an administration away, but in the
setting of the cold war and the fear of being accused of losing another China, Johnson did
not believe he could walk away from the problem.
Added to the internal Vietnamese problems was the increased questioning of
American Vietnam policy by key members of the Congress. Among the most prominent
critics was Senator Wayne Morse, who in the spring of 1964 filled over two hundred
pages of the Congressional Record with speeches critical of the Vietnam conflict. At the
same time, conservative members of Congress were criticizing the Johnson
administration for not prosecuting the war more vigorously.^®

Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina , 311-13.
Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent into Vietnam (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 32224.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

Johnson invited congressional leaders to the 526th meeting of the National Security
Council on April 3,1964, to brief them on the current situation in Vietnam. Secretary of
Defense McNamara summarized policy alternatives which included the possibility of
“broadening the military campaign by taking the war to other areas, such as the North,”
and the possibility o f increasing the present program of assistance. The administration
chose the later.^^
The Senators had several concerns with the proposed course. Senator Leverett
Saltonstall asked if any US soldiers would be fighting or whether they would remain
advisory. Secretary McNamara assured him that they would remain only advisory. Senate
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen then asked about the viability of using SEATO but was
told by Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield that it was only a “paper tiger.” Mansfield
questioned the accuracy o f the press reports from Saigon and the conditions o f the current
government but was informed by McNamara that the real situation was “quite different
from that appearing in the press.” Finally, Senator Flurbert Humphrey wanted an estimate
on what this new enlarged policy would cost and whether the Vietnamese would execute
the new program. McNamara responded that he “doubted that there was a problem” and
then gave him an approximate estimate that the cost would exceed $50 million.^*
Senator Morse was also present at the meeting and disagreed with the entire South
Vietnamese program. He asserted that Washington should have used SEATO and the UN
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to achieve a peaceful settlement. The President assured Morse that he would not have to
be associated with any of the decision made by his administration toward Vietnam.^^
As it became more apparent that the increasing instability in Saigon was pushing
America toward intervention without international support or domestic approval, on April
22, 1964, Secretary Rusk recommended, “We need to get more flags flying in South
Vietnam. We need to help persuade other countries to provide assistance to Vietnam, not
only for the value of assistance, but also because o f its importance to Vietnamese
m o r a l e . T h e next day, on April 23, President Johnson announced at a press conference
that he hoped we would see more flags in Vietnam. The President and the State
Department began the more flags campaign in the hope of bolstering diplomatic support
for Saigon and increasing allied backing in the event of United States intervention. It was
becoming evident that the United States would eventually have to step in and take a more
active role in Vietnam. Many of Johnson’s advisors had been advocating such a step for
months. It was also evident that the administration would face great criticism if it did so.
Secretary o f State Rusk initiated the new policy by sending a joint State-Defense
Message to the Australian Embassy on May 7, 1964. He outlined the situation in
Southeast Asia and encouraged a high level approach to the Australia Government on
assistance to Vietnam. Rusk asserted that “the countries of Southeast and Southwest Asia
are the first line of defense” for Australia and that an expanded effort of assistance to
Southeast Asia would “provide concrete evidence of the Government of Australia’s
sincere desire to maintain political integrity and independence of theses nations.” Rusk
Ibid.
Summary Record o f the 528* Meeting o f the National Security Council, Washington, April 22, 1964,
4:45 p.m., Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1964-1968. Vol. 1, Vietnam (Washington, D.C.,: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1992), 258.
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encouraged Canberra to increase support for Malaysia as well and thereby reduce the
possibility o f Malaysia turning to the United States for assistance. The Secretary urged
Australia to offer more military assistance with the promise that it would result in a
“broader US-Australian discussions.” Rusk’s vague language played on Canberra’s wellknown desire to increase its level of influence on Washington policy decisions while not
committing to any formal offer of exchange.^'
Two weeks later, it was decided that Rusk would make a trip to Vietnam to assess
Saigon’s needs. Following his trip, the Secretary endorsed Johnson’s call for allied
assistance. On May 18, 1964, in a State Department telegram. Rusk said he returned with
the “conviction that it is important for more nations of the Free World to ‘show their
flags’ in Vietnam.” Rusk inadvertently exposed the anxiety in Washington over the lack
of support when he added “the nature and amount of the contribution being sought are
not for the present as significant as the fact of their being made.”
Rusk’s telegram also revealed Washington’s misguided belief that its SEATO allies
would come to America’s assistance. The Secretary cited a SEATO communiqué from
the April SEATO meeting in Manila in which it was stated, “the Counsel agreed that the
members o f SEATO should remain prepared... to take further steps.. .in fulfilling their
obligations under the treaty.” As would become evident over the next few years, not all
of the SEATO members were as prepared to act as Washington hoped.
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While Washington was envisioning military support, the SEATO contributions that
were given came mainly in token economic medical and advisory aid. O f the
Commonwealth members, Australia alone offered combat personnel. Britain resisted any
discussion o f combat forces but did agree to send some counter-insurgency advisors.
Canada refused any help on the grounds that their membership on the ICC precluded
involvement but consented to conveying negotiation messages to Hanoi via its
Commission membership. Canada was also contributing $1,500,000 to South Vietnam
through the Colombo plan to fund technical assistance, food supplies and funding for the
university of Hue, but Ottawa believed that any other assistance would jeopardize
Canada’s role in the ICC.^"* The United States elected to continue conversations with the
Commonwealth and to assess the situation further.
By early June, President Johnson began to worry that the United States was moving
too rapidly toward war. Johnson decided to use Canadian member o f the ICC, J. Blair
Seaborn, to convey his first peace overtures to North Vietnam. On June 18, 1964,
Seaborn was sent as an intermediary but not an advocate o f the United States. He served
as a candid, neutral intermediary. The United States requested that Ho Chi Minh abide by
the Geneva Accords by keeping his men and supplies out of the South and cutting
assistance to the Viet Cong. Seaborn was also told to assure Ho Chi Minh that the United
States had no intentions o f over throwing the government of North Vietnam or
maintaining bases in the South, but was willing to provide both sides with economic
development assistance if peace were accepted. Hanoi responded that the United States
should withdraw and that a neutral regime should be set up in accordance with the
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National Liberation Front’s (NLF) program in which the country would be reunited under
a representative regime led by the NLF. Despite this unsuccessful mission, Seaborn was
sent again in August with a similar proposal but received an even less open response.
Once again, it appeared that a combat commitment might be the only US alternative and
America would have to gather a coalition soon or move forward alone.
By July 24, 1964, America’s frustration with her allies was becoming evident. Even
though the United States had yet to commit officially to sending combat troops, the sense
of urgency to do so was weighting heavily on Washington. In a circular telegram to
various US embassies, most notably to London and Ottawa, the President expressed his
urgent desire to gain assistance from third country sources. Through a personal plea to his
ambassadors, Johnson assigned the task o f gaining third country contributions and made
clear that no other task “precedes this one in its urgency and its significance.” The
President explained that he was “gravely disappointed by the inadequacy o f the actions
by our friends and allies” and regretted their failure to “recognize their share o f this
responsibility.” The ambassadors were charged with reminding the governments of their
responsibility as Free Nations to protect the freedom of others, and if necessary, to
remind those who owed their freedom to assistance from others that they shared an even
larger burden. Johnson hoped to play on the conscience of those nations, most notably
Britain, which had received American help during World War II. The ambassadors were
directed to exploit the close ties of America’s allies by emphasizing, “in the truest sense
therefore the allied response to this request is the test of the merit of our alliance.

Johnson, Vantage Point. 67.
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The decision to commit to combat and the need for third country assistance in
Vietnam became more immediate on August 2, 1964, when North Vietnamese patrol
boats in the Gulf o f Tonkin reportedly attacked the US Destroyer Ma JJox. Two days
later the C. Turner Joy also reported being under attack. Despite the questionable validity
of the second report and the suspicious location of the Maddox when the first attack
occurred. President Johnson ordered air strikes against North Vietnamese torpedo boat
bases and oil storage facilities. Then on August 7, Johnson asked and received from
Congress the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution granting him authority to take all necessary
measures to defend US forces in Southeast Asia. Johnson’s response to the incident was
well received by the majority of Congress and the American public and effectively
removed the Vietnam issue from the upcoming presidential election against Republican
candidate Barry Goldwater. The only things standing in the way of a full US commitment
in Vietnam was Johnson’s worry of war costs affecting his Great Society and the fact that
the United States still had not secured allied support for the campaign.
Some members of the administration were optimistic that the Tonkin incident would
improve the prospects of the more flags campaign. On August 6, the State Department
received a telegram from the English Prime Minister expressing Britain’s support for “the
action taken by the U.S. Government in accordance with the inherent right of selfdefense.” The Prime Minister did not, however, offer any military support for future
actions. He agreed only to help reduce the international tension caused by the attacks.
For the remainder of 1964, President Johnson and his advisors considered their
options. The military wanted to extend the air attacks against North Vietnam.
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Ambassador Taylor argued to hold off on attacks because Saigon was too vulnerable to
risk upsetting the North Vietnamese and their allies. Johnson’s senior advisors advocated
a two-phase plan consisting of limited bombing raids against infiltration routes in Laos
and North Vietnam leading into a second phase of a large-scale air offensive against the
North. On December 1, 1964, Johnson approved the phase one bombing operations
against the infiltration lines in Laos but not against North Vietnam. These strikes proved
disagreeable to some of America’s allies and hindered overtures to those allies for
assistance in South Vietnam. Other allies, such as Australia and Britain, found
Washington’s response appropriate.^^
With this increased threat and looming escalation of bombing, Washington once
again looked for allied support. By December, it was ever more apparent that the more
flags campaign was failing. In a memo to the President on December 11, 1964, National
Security Council Staff Member Michael Forrestal outlined the status of third-country
assistance. He focused on six countries he deemed the “best bet for significant additional
help.” Among those six were Australia and New Zealand. Australia had at that date
supplied 167 personnel o f whom 80 percent were combat advisors, six aircraft with crew,
an eight-man surgical team, and a variety o f materiel. Forrestal believed that, despite its
prior commitment to Malaysia and its previous loss of two combat advisors in Vietnam,
that Australia “can be persuaded to make a significant increase in her contribution to
Vietnam.

George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam. 1950-1975.4* ed. (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 143-51.
Memorandum to the President, December 11, 1964, NSF, COF: Viemam, box 11, folder 2, doc. 173,
LBJL.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25

Forrestal was less optimistic about Britain and Canada. Britain had given economic
contributions for education, road building equipment and fishing boats but had only
agreed to send seven people for the British advisory mission. London maintained that its
position as Co-Chair of the 1954 Geneva Conference precluded its military involvement.
The United Kingdom was also heavily burdened in Malaysia without US support.
Forrestal argued that a “strong approach” by the President might produce a small amount
of economic assistance, but concluded anything more was improbable.
Canada was even less likely to increase support. Through the Colombo Plan, Ottawa
had already provided $1,500,000 in educational, medical and commodity assistance, but
refused to move beyond the single person already in Vietnam, and as Forrestal observed,
was considering withdrawing from the ICC because they were in “ a sour mood.”
Forrestal’s recommendation: “do not hit them again.”^^
Based on the assessment that Australia was the most likely source for additional
support, Johnson decided to address Canberra. The President made a direct appeal to
Prime Minister Menzies in a December 12, 1964, letter in which he emphasized the US
need for third country assistance and that Australian support would be greatly
appreciated. The Prime Minister responded on December 18, 1964, that, while Canberra
could not meet all of the requested supplies and advisors, further contributions were
“already in prospect” and the United States had Australia’s continued support.'*’

Memorandum to the President, December 11, 1964, NSF, COF: Vietnam, box 11, folder 2, doc. 173,
LBJL.
Letter From Prime Minister Menzies to President Johnson, December 18, 1964, NSF, Head o f State
Correspondence, box 1, Australia-Menzies Correspondence folder, dos. 60a, LBJL.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26
United States Escalation
On February 6, 1965, the U.S. Army advisers’ barracks and Army Helicopter base at
Pleiku was attacked, killing nine Americans and injuring over one hundred. At the same
time the Soviet Chairman Aleksei Kosygin was visiting Hanoi. That night the President
gathered his advisors and several members of the Foreign Relations Committee to discuss
America’s alternatives. The resulting decision was an air strike against four targets in
North Vietnam. America’s Commonwealth allies responded according to their previous
positions on the conflict. British Parliamentary discussions showed that most in England
felt that the bombings would produce a dangerous political stalemate in which neither
side would agree to a cease-fire on the others’ terms. It was believed that the best solution
would be for the United States and Russia to break the stalemate with the “UK spurring
them on.”'*^
On March 2, the Johnson administration instituted air strikes as a set policy o f gradual
and steady reprisal directed against North Vietnam. The air campaign was known as
Rolling Thunder.'*^ The first American ground troops arrived on March 8, 1965, when
two marine battalions were deployed to guard the air base at Danang. On March 17,
General William Westmoreland, the US Commander in Vietnam, requested permission to
land marines at Hue. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor agreed with the request and told
President Johnson, “We will soon have to decide whether to try to get by with indigenous
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forces or to supplement them with Third Country troops, largely if not exclusively

British reaction to this new bombing strategy was mixed. Many in London felt that
the bombing was going too far and that America needed to pull out. Others were reluctant
to alienate Washington by criticizing the move and hoped that negotiations might ensue
despite the increased level of violence. American Ambassador to London David Bruce
reported on March 5 that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had met with him to
discuss the new bombings. They affirmed that, “there is no question of the continuing
loyal support o f the British Government for the US in South Vietnam.” They went on to
contend that, “our tactical position and theirs would be much stronger if [the United
States] demonstrated initiative toward n e g o tia tio n s .T h re e weeks later, London
remained committed to its position. On March 25, 1965, the British Foreign Secretary
stated, “Britain wholly supports American action in Vietnam... we do believe that in the
military situation the United States... must strike at North Vietnam.” He went on to state,
“but that does not remove the necessity of trying to seek every reasonable way of
bringing the conflict to an end.”"*^
In late March, Viet Cong forces attacked the American Embassy in Saigon with
explosives, killing two Americans and injuring several more including Deputy
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson. Shortly after, on April 1 and 2, the President and his
advisors including Ambassador Taylor met to formulate the next step for Vietnam. The
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President authorized the deployment of two more Marine battalions and one Marine air
squadron and an additional 18,000 to 20,000- man support force. He also approved a
change in the combat status of the Marines to a “more active role.” According to
Johnson’s memoirs, this did not mean an unlimited combat role but rather approved
aggressive patrolling and limited counterinsurgency operations near the Marine bases.
When these escalations proved unsuccessful, Johnson asked Secretary Rusk on April
20 to organize a conference o f Washington officials, and members of the Mission in
Saigon and the Pacific Command in Honolulu to reassess the situation. The resulting
report suggested the best possible outcome would be to increase military and
psychological warfare to pressure the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Viet
Cong to accept a political solution. LBJ’s advisors estimated that it could take up to two
years, recommended a buildup of an additional 33,500 American troops and suggested
the South Vietnamese ask Australia and South Korea for additional soldiers. President
Johnson approved portions o f the Honolulu Conference’s recommended increase,
agreeing to send the 173’^^' Airborne Brigade and the 3'^*’ Marine Amphibious Brigade, thus
increasing U.S. forces in Vietnam to over 50,000. These troops were allowed to patrol
near bases in conjunction with South Vietnamese troops.
At this point, Washington had a clear idea that Australia was the only Commonwealth
member willing to provide military assistance in Vietnam. In a meeting in Secretary of
State Rusk’s office on April 13, Australian Ambassador Waller announced Canberra’s
decision to supply one battalion for service in South Vietnam. Rusk was appreciative and
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told the ambassador “the battalion would be worth many times its numbers both on the
ground and in terms of its effect on public opinion in the World and in the United
States.”'*^ On April 29, Prime Minister Menzies publicly announced Canberra’s decision
to deploy one infantry battalion to South Vietnam. His statement made it clear that
Australia was acting at the request of Saigon and that the battalion would collaborate as
necessary with the United States.
The British remained adamantly opposed to military involvement. By April even the
President had resigned himself to the idea that the United Kingdom’s only role would be
to aid in possible negotiations. Prime Minister Wilson provided a clear appraisal in his
account of an April 15 meeting with Johnson: “apart from an occasional moment in future
years when President Johnson revived the notion o f British military presence in Vietnam,
these April talks set out a division of function.” Thereafter, the Americans would
continue to fight in Vietnam and the British would continue initiating peace talks.
With the increased troop commitment and the continued bombing of the North,
Washington experienced high levels of criticism at home and abroad. In his April 15
meeting with British Prime Minister Wilson, Johnson indicated his willingness to
reinitiate negotiations. Once again the Prime Minister urged the President to halt the
bombing as a gesture of his sincerity. After obtaining Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Earle Wheeler’s opinion that a pause would not cause serious harm.
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Johnson agreed to an eight-day bombing pause on May 10 and on a peace overture to
Hanoi. By May 18, the President had no response and therefore resumed the bombing.
For the next month, the United States continued its Rolling Thunder campaign and its
patrolling with the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN).
It was not until June that President Johnson granted General Westmoreland, the
authority to commit US troops to combat “independently of... the Vietnamese.” On June
27, 1965, the first major ground combat operation by U.S. forces commenced when the
173^ Airborne brigade went into combat north of Saigon.^^ With a small coalition
consisting o f a few Southeast Asian countries and only one Commonwealth member, the
United States officially entered the ground war in Vietnam. Washington would continue
to search for more flags with minimal results.

Johnson. Vantage Point. 141-43
” Ibid., 141-43.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 2

AUSTRALIA AND THE VIETNAM WAR
While Washington was encountering opposition to its entry into the Vietnamese
conflict from the majority of its allies, the United States received overt encouragement
from the Australians. With the Japanese ease in occupying Southeast Asia during World
War II that enabled them to threaten Australia from close proximity, Canberra became
painfully aware that the island nation’s security was directly linked to the stability and
security of the region. Australia did not have a large military or the budgetary ability to
increase their military in the event of a crisis. Therefore, Australia’s post-war goal was to
initiate military alliances with its neighbors and with stronger nations to ensure a prowestern military presence in the area at least until they could build their military
sufficiently to ensure their own security.
One of Australia’s first and most important decisions was deciding which major
power to court most aggressively. Traditionally, Australia had looked toward Britain, but
given its new commitment to NATO and its financial constraints following World War II,
Britain’s ability to provide strong and reliable protection in the Pacific region appeared
doubtful. The United States was obviously more capable o f providing a strong and

forceful presence in the South Pacific, but Canberra was also aware that Washington
intended to push for a treaty and a strong alliance with Japan.
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Security Alliance Building
The outbreak o f the Korean War again drew attention to the communist threat in the
South Pacific. The United States decided that the only way to ensure a pro-western Japan
would be to allow it to rebuild its economy and for the America military to safeguard the
island against the Soviet and Chinese threat. With the memory of Japanese aggression in
World War II still fresh, Australia disagreed with America’s leniency and strongly
supported a firmer, more restraining treaty with Japan. In September 1950, knowing that
the United States would have its way on the Japanese issue, Australian Minister of
External Affairs Percy Spender sought a security alliance with Washington in exchange
for Australia’s support for the Japanese treaty. ^ To facilitate Australia’s acquiescence on
the Japanese issue, the United States agreed to a security alliance with Australia and New
Zealand which would effectively become an extension of an already understood security
promise by Washington to its South Pacific friends. While Australia, New Zealand, and
the United States treaty (ANZUS) had no provisions for a military planning organization
and remained only a civilian consultative body, the agreement laid the foundation for
Australia’s heavy reliance on American military support in its future external policies.
This reliance left Australia obligated to the United States when it took on the struggle
against the communists in Vietnam.
American courtship of Australian support for its Vietnam policy began before the
United States was fully committed to the conflict itself. In 1953, prior to the
commencement of the Geneva Conference, the Eisenhower administration began
weighing its options if the French decided to withdraw from Vietnam. In an NSC meeting
in March 1953, it was agreed that the United States would have to have allied support if it
54
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were to take over the French responsibility. Eisenhower and his advisors speculated that
ANZUS could be expanded to gain allied help in any future Vietnamese conflict as long
as the United States agreed to assure the primary military burden. The use of ANZUS
was not pursued at this time, but the NSC meeting did result in a consensus that the
United States should work to ensure a mutual defense system in Southeast Asia.^^ After
the Geneva Accords were signed, America’s interest in Vietnam intensified. By
September 1954, the United States began to look past the French and start easing them
out. Washington feared another country in Asia falling to communism and explored all
avenues to bolster Vietnam without direct US involvement.
Australia had even greater anxiety over the Geneva Agreement. Canberra was
acutely aware o f the geographical closeness of Communist China and did not want
another communist regime even closer. In April 1964, Labour Party Leader Arthur
Calwell told an audience at Darwin that communism was now 350 miles from Australia
and was creeping further south. Australians were readily applying the Domino Theory, so
popular in American rhetoric. Calwell criticized the Geneva Agreement as an attempt to
save Europe by sacrificing Asia. Many in Canberra understood their strategic dependence
on European allies and were frustrated with other Commonwealth countries for not
sympathizing more with the security problems of Southeast Asia. County Party Minister
H. L. Anthony evoked the images of the appeasement of Munich by comparing British
attitude toward Communist China to policies of the 1930s.
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This worry led Canberra to work for more security in the region. Historian Peter
Edwards asserts that Australia developed a goal of quadripartite planning. The objective
was an agreement between Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain and the United States
to share in defense planning for Southeast Asia, with an equal and ongoing dialogue
among all the m e m b e rs.W h e n Washington proposed organizing SEATO, Australia
saw its opportunity. Canberra readily signed the treaty knowing that membership could
lead to a request for troop contributions if the signatories agreed to any military action in
the treaty region. The treaty did not automatically require such participation but did
create an obligatory feeling in Australia to contribute in the event the United States
decided to intervene in Vietnam. Signing SEATO would satisfy Washington’s desire to
ensure future action against communist aggression in the region and offered Australia the
three things it most wanted: a firm commitment by the United States to the security of
Southeast Asia, a way to keep Britain involved in Malaysia, and a security arrangement
in which Australia had an ostensibly equal partnership with other European and Western
powers.

The Communist Threat in Southeast Asia
In the decade following the Geneva Conference, Australia’s attention turned to
Indonesia and Malaysia. Following the establishment of a provisional constitution and
independence, Indonesia was riddled with factionalism. Between the 1950 declaration of
independence and 1965 coup, which replaced President Achmed Sukarno, Indonesia was
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consumed with factional struggles among the Army, the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI), and Sukarno. By late 1957, Sukarno had contained most of the opposition but still
had to maintain the balance between the PKI and the army.
At the same time, the former British colony of Malaya posed another concern for
Australia. Beginning in 1949, the Federation of Malaya, comprised of 35 percent Chinese
population, began lighting a communist -led insurrection. After gaining independence in
1957, Malaya continued to struggle against the communist minority and to face economic
and security troubles. In 1961, in an attempt to relieve itself of its formal empire in
Southeast Asia and to stabilize Malaya, the United Kingdom, along with Malayan Prime
Minister Abdul Rahman Putra, proposed the formation of a Malaysian Federation which
would include Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. Indonesia
President Sukarno opposed the formation because he believed Britain’s intention was not
to grant independence but to control Malaysia as an economic satellite. Sukarno was a
strong nationalist committed to eliminating all European colonialists from Southeast Asia
through a policy he called Konfrontasi (Confrontation). Sukarno declared a
“Confrontation” against Malaya in an attempt to stop the formation of the federation and
to force England to abandon its Southeast Asian possessions. The resulting struggle led to
major British involvement in Southeast Asia and pressure on the Australian Government
to provide a battalion to support Britain in Malaya.
Australia also had to consider the ramification of British decline during the 1950s.
Britain’s struggling, post-war economic capabilities left it overextended geopolitically.
Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia. 1961-1965: Britain, the United States and
the Creation o f Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-12.
John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British. American. Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the
Malaysia-Indonesian Confrontation. 1961-5 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 41-45.
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During the decade following Geneva, Britain reassessed its capabilities and determined to
end its commitments to all places ‘East of Suez’ and to find ways to improve its
economic situation by applying for membership in the European Economic Community
(EEC). Britain and Australia turned to the United States for assistance in Malaysia and
Indonesian, but Washington was unwilling to become embroiled with this newly de
colonized area.^’ At a meeting with the British Prime Minister and the Australian
Ambassador in February 1964, Secretary Rusk expressed the opinion that the United
States could not publicly indicate displeasure with Sukarno’s action because it would
“destroy our leverage with Sukarno and in no way contribute to a peaceful settlement.”
Washington preferred to stay in constant contact with Sukarno, to “lay down the law”
with him.^^ Thus, it was left to the Commonwealth partners to stabilize the region. This
placed a great strain on Australian resources and worried Canberra that the absence o f a
committed and powerful pro-western ally in the region could leave Australia vulnerable.
By 1962, Canberra had begun reassessing its defense policy. Australia was
geographically close to communist China and the turbulent regions of Vietnam, Malaysia
and Indonesia. It had a small and already taxed military with nearly no extra personnel
for use in its own defense. Canberra had historically denied defense planners budgetary
increases and Australia’s allies were urging more assistance for Southeast Asian defense.
The Australian Department of Defense determined that the best policy for Australian
security would be a forward defense strategy. The plan involved containing the enemy
forces as far from Australia as possible. The Defense Committee wanted to extend the
Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press
Australia, 1988), 61-63.
Supplemental Briefing: US-UK-Aust-NZ meeting, February 11, 1964, NSF, COF: Europe and USSR,
UK, box 213, doc 13d, LBJL.
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nation’s “strategic interests to Southeast Asia as the center and closest part o f the allied
defense line extending from Pakistan to Japan.” To do this required keeping Great Britain
engaged in Malaysia and Indonesia. Because the United States was unwilling to consider
military assistance to Indonesia, when Washington began to show concern for South
Vietnam in October 1961, Canberra pushed American involvement there. Australia began
a rapid build-up o f the military to a level that could provide security in the event that
Britain and the United States retreated from the area. Unfortunately, budgetary problems
left such an escalation unlikely until 1970. Thus, Australia’s immediate goal remained
keeping the two larger allies in the region until at least 1970.^^
By October 1961, Washington had received enough reports from South Vietnam to
conclude that Saigon would need assistance from third country sources. The civil war in
Laos was about to be resolved in Geneva and the United States believed that Vietnam
was the next target for the communists. Discussion began in Washington to assist the
South Vietnamese regime under Diem. Kennedy agreed to financial assistance and began
sending advisory troops, but decided to hold off on any further commitment until a
multilateral agreement through SEATO could be reached. On November 11, Rusk and
McNamara recommended that for political reasons, “it would seem important to involve
forces from other nations alongside the United States. Our position would be greatly
strengthened if the introduction of forces could be taken as a SEATO action.”^'* Their
focus was on the Commonwealth members because they held the most diplomatic respect
among the US public and domestic politicians. Australia was very receptive to the idea.

“ Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 247.
Draft Memorandum for the President, November 8, 1961, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1961
(Washington, D C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 561-66.
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After a series o f negotiations, on December 19, 1961, Australia agreed to supply arms
and ammunition and a small number of advisers. This marked the introduction of
Australian military personnel into South Vietnam. While small in number- mainly
because Australian forces were already committed to Malaysia which seemed more
threatening to Australia at the time- the Americans took it as a much needed approval o f
its commitment to sustaining South Vietnam. For Australia, their meager offer helped to
sustain Washington’s interest in the region.
Over the next two years, the United States, with the help of allies such as Australia,
provided economic and military advisory assistance to the Diem regime of Saigon. It was
hoped that through military training and economic encouragement that the Diem regime
could solidify its power, expel the communist controlled Viet Cong from the south, and
build a strong enough military to stave off North Vietnamese Communist aggression.
Those hopes faded when it became evident to the American delegation in Saigon that the
Diem regime would not implement much needed reforms and that public support for
Diem had declined. When Diem was deposed and assassinated in a coup during the first
week of November 1963, Washington and Canberra began rethinking their strategy.
Australia was shocked to learn of Diem’s fate. Many in Canberra believed that the
military situation in Vietnam had improved and that the strategic hamlet operation was
going reasonably well. Following the coup, Australia took its cue from Washington and
chose to place its faith in the new Saigon Government. Mainly this was the result of
Australia’s preoccupation with the new “Confrontation” in Malaysia. The Australian
Cabinet knew that the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating and that pressure for
assistance would be coming. However, with its commitment to Malaysia, Australia chose
Pemberton, Australia’s Road to Vietnam. 145-49.
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to wait for an American decision before offering an increase in involvement. That
decision did not come until April of 1964 when the Americans implemented its more
flags campaign.

Australia’s Decision to Commit Troops
Australia turned most of its attention to Indonesia in the first months of 1964.
However, when the various British and UN peace proposals for Vietnam were presented
to the United States in the spring, Australia became alarmed. Canberra did not want the
United States to negotiate its way out of Vietnam before Australia had enhanced its own
military. With the United Kingdom pushing to resolve the Indonesian “Confrontation”
and withdraw from Southeast Asia within six years, Canberra needed the insurance of a
strong American presence in the area to maintain security. Australia pushed Washington
to reject any negotiations until the war turned more in Saigon’s favor and South Vietnam
could enter into negotiations from a position of strength. The Australians hoped this
would keep the United States in Vietnam for several years.
In May 1964, the U. S. State Department issued another plea to Canberra for
increased assistance as part of its more flags campaign. Reminding Australia o f the
importance of Southeast Asian security, the United States requested more economic and
logistical aid to both Vietnam and Thailand. Combat forces were not mentioned, but a
call for all other support was intended to enable the American forces to be “reoriented
and concentrated in projects of a purely military nature.”^’

^ Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 335-36.
Telegram, Rusk to American Embassy Canberra, May 7, 1964, NSF, COF: Asia and the Pacific, box 233
(1 o f 2), Vol. I, doc. 1, LBJL.
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Australia continued to provide as much economic assistance as it could but was
unable to supply many of the items that American desired. Canberra considered sending
combat forces even though they were not requested and continued to give the United
States public support and encouragement. Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident,
Australia fully endorsed Washington’s retaliatory bombing. Minister of the Department
of External Affairs Paul Hasluck stated, “It is our hope that the restrained but determined
actions of the United States will have a strong deterrent effect on the aggressor.” He also
reiterated Canberra’s intent to assist in the defense of Southeast Asia against the
Communists.^*
For the next few months, while Washington contemplated future limited bombing of
North Vietnam, Johnson pushed to recharge the State Department’s effort to gain more
flags. Following an assessment of the more flags campaign’s progress, the President
increased the pressure on America’s more willing allies. On December 12, 1964, Johnson
sent a letter to Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies requesting additional combat
support for the actions that the United States planned to take. While official Washington
was to maintain its current policy of backing the Saigon regime with economic and
advisory assistance, Johnson and his staff were developing other options which included
a possible increase in bombing o f North Vietnam and an introduction of American
combat forces. The President was not ready to commit to this escalation but wanted to
know what type of international support he could expect if he chose to e s c a la te .T h e
letter emphasized the need for Americans to “understand they are not alone in the defense
of the freedom of a country which is geographically so far away,” and thanked the
Pemberton, Australia’s Road to Vietnam. 210-11.
® Mann, A Grand Delusion. 371-77.
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Minister for the assistance Australia had provided thus far. Johnson continued, “I cannot
exaggerate the importance of any enlarged efforts in Vietnam which you are able to
make.” Johnson listed the contributions that America most needed from Australia,
including 200 additional combat advisors, minesweepers, and non-military aid. The
President ended with a personal overture to Menzies, asserting that he was aware o f the
difficulty this request would create, but “1 would not make this request as an American
President to an Australian Prime Minister if 1 were not sure both that the problem is
urgent and that I am writing to a strong and determined friend.”’’’
Prime Minster Menzies responded on December 18, 1964, with a guarded but still
favorable response. The Prime Minister explained that Australia was unable to send the
200 requested combat advisors because they were needed in Australia to train its new
conscripts. They were also lacking many of the requested vessels and the few they did
possess were already engaged in other areas. Menzies assured the President that the non
military requests were “already in prospect” and reiterated that Australia intended to
“continue to support you and you can be assured of our wish to do whatever lies within
our physical capacity.””
Following the exchange o f letters between President Johnson and Prime Minister
Menzies, the Office o f External Affairs considered whether Australia should send a
battalion to South Vietnam “in order to obtain some forward momentum in American
policy formulation.”

Some members feared that the commitment of combat forces

Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Menzies, December 12, 1964, NSF, Head o f State
Correspondence, box 1, Australia-Menzies Correspondence folder, doc. 62. LBJL.
Letter From Prime Minister Menzies to President Johnson, December 18, 1964, NSF, Head o f State
Correspondence, box 1, Australia-Menzies Correspondence folder, dos. 60a, LBJL.
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could have negative consequences. Domestic opposition to Australian involvement in
South Vietnam was growing and there were concerns among several Cabinet members
that the instability of the Saigon Government would only lead to a protracted
involvement. There were others who worried that the decision would tie Australian
credibility and security to American action only to have Washington agree to the
proposed negotiations before Saigon was in a position o f strength. Other Cabinet
members believed the best way for Australia to keep the United States from the
negotiation table was to show support through troop involvement. Ultimately, it was
decided to delay the decision until after the anticipated military staff talks with the United
States but to confirm in the interim that Australia would give public support for increased
bombing of North Vietnam.’^
When the military staff talks were postponed, Canberra urged Washington to meet
with Australian officials in the interim. Washington agreed to meet in early February
1965. Minister of Defense Shane Paltridge was sent to the meetings and instructed by
Minister of External Affairs Hasluck to assure Washington that Australia’s goal was to
“remove any hesitation on the part of the Americans and, within our limited resources, to
go with them but not to rush out in front.” At this same time. Prime Minister Menzies and
Prime Minister Wilson were attending Winston Churchill’s funeral and had hoped to talk
with President Johnson about a possible four-power conference on joint action on
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia and Vietnam. Johnson, however, chose not to attend

Memorandum o f Conversation o f State Department and Ambassador Waller, NSF, COF: Australia, box
233 (1 o f 2), Vol. I. Doc. 91a, LBJL.
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and Secretary Rusk avoided any serious sessions. Australia remained interested in
holding military staff talks, but got no response.’'*
Instead, following Winston Churchill’s funeral, Australian Prime Minister Menzies
and British Prime Minister Wilson met to discuss Vietnam. Wilson explained to Menzies
the pressure he was under from the both the British public and members of his own party
to oppose United States policy in Vietnam. He was being urged to reconvene the Geneva
Conference to resolve the issue. Wilson assured Menzies that “the British would not
make any proposal to refer the matter to Geneva unless and until the United States
approved.”
Then on February 6, 1965, the Viet Cong launched a series of attacks on US military
installations in South Vietnam. The United States responded with Operation Flaming
Dart bombing campaign. Australian Minister Paul Hasluck endorsed US action and
especially approved attacks on targets related to North Vietnamese infiltration o f the
South. By February 20, Washington agreed to the military staff talks with Australia to
encourage Canberra to send much needed ground troops to help secure the northern
regions of South Vietnam near DaNang.’^ William Bundy prepared a Checklist of
Diplomatic Actions on February 9, 1965, that recommended that the United States have
“full consultation” with Australia through the Embassy and proposed, “quiet joint
planning.””

Glen St J. Barclay, A Very Small Insurance Policy: The Politics o f Australian Involvement in Vietnam.
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While Australia officially endorsed the American bombing campaign, internally the
Labor Government was conflicted. Some supported American involvement in South
Vietnam to counter Communist China. Members such as Deputy Parliamentary
Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam wanted to see US involvement increase until Saigon
could go to the negotiation table with the advantage. Another group, led by Parliamentary
Opposition Leader Arthur Calwell, was critical of an American escalation that could drag
Australian troops into a commitment but was still willing to keep Australia’s prior
promises to Washington. A third group readily endorsed American active involvement in
the region, but thought that South Vietnam was the wrong place. Dr. J. F. Caims, the
emerging leader of the left wing of the federal Parliamentary Labor Party, believed that
the best prospects for peace would come with an American backed strategic line enforced
by air and sea power and running from Australia through the Philippines to Alaska. He
endorsed the policy o f containment, but did not consider the struggle in Vietnam the
result of outside aggression and therefore not the right place for the Western allies to
expend their resources. The anxiety across the Australian domestic front over Vietnam
obviously mirrored that of the other American allies, but the Australian Government
maintained its official pro-American stance in the hope that the United States would
sustain its commitment to the region.^*
Historian Peter Edwards has asserted, Australia and the United States were on parallel
but not identical paths regarding Vietnam. Australia’s goal was to “reinforce the views of
like-minded elements” in America but that in reality, Canberra had little more than
“marginal influence on the course of United States policy.” He claims that the hawks of

Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 346-47.
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the American administration appreciated the public support that Australia was willing to
give when America’s other allies declined, hut that Australian pressure had no real
significance to Washington policy decisions.

There were far greater forces driving

America toward combat involvement in Vietnam, hut Canberra’s insistence in the
vulnerability of Southeast Asia and Australian official’s application of the Domino
Theory to the region, helped the hawks in Washington assert their position with more
weight.
Throughout February and March 1965, there was another storm of peace proposals
from both American allies and communist adversaries. Among the efforts was the British
proposal to re-open the Geneva Conference. Australia remained adamantly opposed to
negotiations while Saigon was in a vulnerable position. As Britain pushed the Americans
harder toward negotiation, the Australians grew more disillusioned with their
Commonwealth partner. It was indicative of the deteriorating relationship that Canberra
learned of the British overture for negotiations from Washington rather than London.
Australian Ambassador to Washington John Keith Waller and External Affairs Minster
Paul Hasluck worried that Johnson would acquiesce and Australia would lose its
influence in Washington. Australia launched a counter diplomatic initiative opposing
negotiations. Australian High Commissioner in London, Sir Alexander Downer was
directed to urge British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart not to pursue premature
negotiations or to try to convince the United States to “surrender their freedom of military
action.” Then in March, Australian Ambassador to the United Nations David Hay
objected to Secretary General U Thant’s peace proposal and his insistence that Ho Chi

Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 349-50.
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Minh was a nationalist and not a communist and that the confrontation in Vietnam was
civil war in which the United States should not be involved.
Prime Minister Menzies reaffirmed the Australian commitment in March when he
responded to an anti-war, pro-negotiation letter from Anglican bishops in Australia.
Menzies composed a letter that was sent to Washington and London as well as to the
bishops in which he unmistakably showed Australia’s support for a “forceful United
States policy.” Menzies accused the communists of repeatedly violating the Geneva
Agreements through their “establishment and maintenance” of the Viet Cong who were
“determined upon revolution by violence.” The letter praised the Americans for their
“courageous and generous acceptance of responsibilities for the protection o f human
freedom” and suggested that the United States should not negotiate with the Viet Cong as
they had already proven they would disregard any agreement. While the Prime Minister
did not suggest sending Australian troops, his strong language was meant to discourage
President Johnson from seeking negotiations and to prepare the way for a possible
commitment in the future.
Other members o f the Menzies Government also spoke out against the negotiation
proposals and hoped to discourage the Americans from withdrawing from Southeast
Asia. On March 23, External Affairs Minster Paul Hasluck stated in Parliament that
Vietnam was “not a local rebellion caused by internal discontent but the application of
the methods and doctrines of Communist guerrilla warfare first evolved in China.” He

' Barclay, Politics o f Australian Involvement in Vietnam. 94-98.
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warned that if Americans withdrew from South Vietnam, it would leave the way open for
the Chinese to take Vietnam and then Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and “further.”*^
The delayed Military staff talks were finally held in Honolulu on March 30 and April
1, 1965. In a preparatory hrief on March 25, Minister of Defense Pabridge directed the
Australian delegation to secure detailed information on American plans for military
operations and how the United States proposed to deal with the problem of “foreign
troops operating on a civil war in which they will have great difficulty in distinguishing
friend for foe.”

The delegates were given vague answers to their inquiry. They were

left with the impression that an enclave strategy, in which American forces would he
deployed around major US bases with the authorization to conduct offensive operations
within a fifty-mile radius of each base, would be implemented and that other countries
might he asked to contribute. Australian Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed
Services Frederick Scherger, head of the Australian delegation, “indicated that Australia
would contribute forces to South Vietnam in response to any U.S. request.” On April 5,
US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Leonard Unger told Australian
Ambassador to France Alan Renouf that the United States would deploy three more
marine battalions for combat and that Australia should expect an official request for a
battalion contribution and another 150 instructors to train the ARVN regional forces.
On April 7, 1965, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (FAD) met and made
the final decision on Australian commitment. The discussion reflected the wide range of

Edwards, Crises and Commitments, 356.
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opinions running through Canberra. Chairman Scherger told the group that he had been
given unconfirmed information that the United States was preparing an enclave strategy
and that Washington hoped that Australia would provide at least one battalion. Hasluck
wanted to delay until after President Johnson’s upcoming speech at Johns Hopkins
University to better assess the real U.S. intension. He also feared that Australia was
spread too thin in Southeast Asia and should assess the best place to deploy the one
battalion available. Opposing Hasluck was Cabinet Minister Harold Holt. The future
Prime Minister felt that Australia should give the largest contribution possible regardless
of “the final outcome of the United States intervention in Vietnam.” Country Party
Leader John McEwen, another future Prime Minister, agreed since Australia needed to do
everything possible to encourage the Americans to stay in Vietnam. Prime Minister
Menzies concurred, because Australian security would he in jeopardy if South Vietnam
fell to communism. He anticipated that the psychological effect of Australian aid on their
American allies would be advantageous.
The debate also involved the level of commitment that Australia could afford.
Menzies warned that pledging a battalion to Vietnam would strain Australia’s
responsibility to Indonesia. He also worried that deploying another 150 advisors would
leave Australia unable to train its new conscripts. He wanted to remind both the United
State and Britain that Australia would require assistance for the region if they were to
pledge another battalion in Southeast Asia. Defense Minister Paltridge also preferred a
clear explanation of the role and location of the battalion’s deployment before Australia
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agreed. Ultimately, the FAD Committee refused the request for an additional 150
advisors but agreed to dispatch a battalion.
Once the decision was made, Australia needed the South Vietnamese Government to
formally request the battalion. On April 22, 1965, the State Department notified the
American and Australian ambassadors to Saigon that a formal request would be made to
South Vietnamese Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat but that no private approaches
should he initiated until a final approval was received. Washington approached the
Saigon Government delicately because Quat was reluctant to approve additional troops
until he was sure “additional forces were needed and because there is a question in his
mind as to whether foreign troops are suitable for winkling out terrorists among the 14
million people in South Viet-Nam.”^’ Australia received its formal request after a few
discussions between the general and the American and Australian ambassadors.
On April 29, 1965, Prime Minister Menzies officially announced in the House of
Representative that Australia would send one battalion to South Vietnam in response to a
request from the RVN government. In his speech he told the House, “the takeover of
South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of
South and Southeast Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.”^^
Australia’s decision to offer a battalion to the struggle in Vietnam was not undertaken
lightly. For fifteen years prior to the April 29, 1965, announcement, Canberra had pushed
Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 362.
Telegram State Department to American Embassy Saigon, April 22, 1965, NSF, COF:Vietnam, box 193,
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the United States and Great Britain for a stronger presence in the region. The often
relentless urging left little room for maneuvering out of a reciprocal offer when the
Americans answered their pleas. Australia seemed more concerned with building a strong
American-Australian security relationship in the region and with maintaining strong
assurance by the United Kingdom than with the actual situation South Vietnam. Most
fateful of all, no one in the Australia’s successive governments ever questioned
America’s ability to win the conflict once committed. It was assumed that the US military
juggernaut would stop the flow of communism. As Scherger himself said in retrospect,
“If one expected America to do anything on our behalf, then we had to do something to
show willingness to assist. It never was conceivable to us that America would lose.”
Before Australia withdrew from the conflict, Canberra sent another two battalions and
endured repercussions at home similar to those felt in Washington. At the height of its
involvement in 1967, Australia had over 8,300 troops in Vietnam and lost 494 men.
After Prime Minster Harold Holt died in December 1967, the new Prime Minister John
Gorton informed President Johnson that no more troop increases would come. By 1969,
Canberra began a gradual process of withdrawal that would be completed in December
1971*°
Like many other allies, Australians ultimately became disillusioned with the United
States. Australia’s disappointment was unique in that political opinion was split between
the left and right as represented by the left and right wings of the Democratic Labour
Party. The Left wing was troubled with the initial engagement and commitment in

' Edwards, Crises and Commitments. 375.
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Vietnam and the validity of US involvement. The Right wing originally favored the war
hut opposed US disengagement from South Vietnam without providing for a viable
government in Saigon.^' Ultimately, the Australian security relationship with the United
States was damaged but not permanently destroyed.
Assessing the decision to commit troops to Vietnam in terms of national security,
Australia acted on the assumption that it could not provide adequate security for itself
without outside, particularly United States, aid. Faced with a small standing military, a
growing threat from China, and the fresh memories of Japanese aggression in World War
II, the Australian Government placed great importance on the Domino Theory in both
Vietnam and Indonesia. Australian officials, such as Minister o f External Affairs Paul
Hasluck, believed that American success in Vietnam was vital to Australian security.
Only when it became apparent that the United States would not succeed in the war did
Australian opinion turn against America. In the end. South Vietnam fell to the
communists, but the dominos fell no further. Australian security remained stable and
unthreatened by North Vietnamese or Chinese communist aggression.

Like the United

States, Australia had misjudged the geopolitical dynamics in Southeast Asia.
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CHAPTER 3

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE VIETNAM WAR
While the Vietnam War brought Australia closer to the United States, it forced a
greater rift between Washington and the other Commonwealth members. Great Britain
had been one of America’s closest and most useful allies, but by the time the Johnson
administration took over, that partnership was becoming a source of great frustration. The
more Washington pressed for troops and public support, the more London turned away.
The escalation of American combat involvement in Vietnam prompted Britain to
break its connection with the United States. The Wilson Government refused to send any
assistance or reinforcements to help the Americans even in the face of great pressure
from President Lyndon B. Johnson and his staff. There were many factors that led to the
decision and most were directly associated with Britain’s struggle to maintain domestic
stability while reasserting its international influence. Domestically, the Wilson
Government faced several problems throughout 1964 and 1965. First, there was great
disagreement between the leftist members of the Labour Party and the members of the
Office of Foreign Affairs over the government’s support for American actions. The
Leftists strongly urged Wilson to disassociate the government from the United States,
placing great pressure on the already weak intra-party coalition. Members such as A.

52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53

Kitson and R. Wadsworth presented the Labour Party with several resolutions calling for
condemnation of United States intervention in Vietnam/^
Britain’s desire to join the European Economic Community (EEC) also influenced
Wilson’s thinking. Britain had applied for membership in the EEC in 1963 but had been
denied entry on the grounds that it was too closely aligned with the United States. French
President Charles de Gaulle had asserted that Britain would not put the interests of the
European Union before that o f America when a conflict arose and therefore should he
excluded.^'* England needed to join the EEC to improve its economic viability and
demonstrate its independence from the Untied States. Britain had relied heavily on the
US backing of sterling to stabilize its economy. If England joined the European
Community, it could rebuild its economy without such a reliance on the Americans. By
disassociating itself from American policy on Vietnam, which the European community
condemned, the British could rebut De Gaul’s claims of British dependency on the
United States.^^
The Labour Government also had to address the public and parliamentary
dissatisfaction with American policy in Vietnam. Incidents of public protests against the
“immorality” of US actions in Vietnam- the increased bombing and the use of nerve gas
by the South Vietnamese Government- were becoming more frequent, culminating in a
teach-in at Oxford University in June 1965. These increasing demonstrations against
American war policy posed a serious threat to the slim Labour majority that existed in
Labour Party, R eport o f the Sixty-Fifth Annual Conference o f the L abour P arty-1966. (Great Britain:
Labour Party, 1964), 182.
“Britain and the United States” letter to the editor, The Times, in Anglo-American Relations Since 1939:
the Enduring Alliance, ed. John Baylis (N ew York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 161.
Richard Crossman, The Diaries o f a Cabinet Minister (2 vols.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1975), 1,336.
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Parliament in 1965. The Wilson Government had won the majority in 1964 by only four
seats. Furthermore, opposition within the party itself, especially from the far left who
disapproved of what they deemed U.S. imperialism in Vietnam threatened a possible
fraeture in the Wilson administration’s eoalition. It was strategically important for Wilson
to find a policy that soothed internal discontent and gained the trust of the European
community while not severing all ties with its historically important ally, the United
States.
Given these contradictory opinions and ongoing economic problems, the Wilson
Government decided that the best policy to satisfy all sides would be to deny military
assistance to the United States while continuing support though mediation and diplomatic
intervention. This would allow Britain to remain sufficiently involved to keep the special
relation in tact while not showing support for the highly unpopular military aspects of the
confliet.^^ Still, even this political strategy carried problems. First, it assumed that both
the United States and the Vietnamese countries were open to mediation. Second, it
assumed that the Wilson government still had the influence neeessary to conduct the
proeess. Third, it depended on the eorrectness of Wilson’s belief that the British publie
would accept his rejection of military involvement as a sufficiently firm stance against
the United States. The Prime Minister would discover that his government did not have
the necessary influenee to bring all parties to the negotiating table and that his efforts
would not quiet the growing diseontent with America’s Vietnam policy in Britain.

^ Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East o f Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 105-8.
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Britain’s Declining International
Standing
Following World War II, Great Britain’s international influence as well as its
economic power gradually deteriorated due to the instability of its sterling currency and
failures of several foreign policy actions such as the Suez crisis of 1956. Assistance and
support from the United States had traditionally been important to London’s ability to
sustain its place in the international arena, hut as the British decline became more
apparent, England was forced to forge its own path. By loosening the tie with the United
States and moving toward a Eurocentric foreign policy, London sought to ensure a new
place for Great Britain in international affairs. Applying for membership in the European
Economic Community (EEC) was critical. Membership would open up new markets for
the struggling English economy and enable London to forge a stronger security
relationship with its European allies. Also, because of the economic struggles. Great
Britain began to recognize the need to lighten its economic burdens by withdrawing from
colonies in Africa and the Middle East. As debates over these issues lingered in
Parliament, they sent a message to the international community of yet another sign of
Britain’s slip from world power.
Several things stood in the way of re-aligning British foreign policy. The first was
London’s pre-existing commitment to Malaysia. Beginning in 1949, the Federation of
Malaya began fighting a communist -led insurrection by the Chinese immigrants who
comprised about 35 percent of Malaya’s population. After gaining independence in 1957,
the Federation of Malaya continued to struggle against the communist minority for
another three decades.
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Meanwhile, Indonesia faced similar problems. The Indonesian national election o f
1955 produced no parliamentary party majority and forced President Achmed Sukarno to
reform the party system and solidify more control within the presidency to create
stability. In October 1956, Sukarno visited the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of
China and returned with a new policy he called “guided democracy” in which he began to
prohibit most political parties and suppress regional factions who posed a threat to the
federal government. By March 1957, the last autonomous regional government collapsed
and Sukarno declared martial law. Few political parties survived. One notable exception
was the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which in the July 1957 provincial elections
on Java became the largest party. It seemed evident to the western allies that Sukarno was
willing to use the PKI to solidify his own control. London worried that this left all o f
Indonesia vulnerable to communist take-over.
Britain knew that its withdrawal from the area would leave Malaya even more
vulnerable and could lead to Communist domination o f region. It was decided to build up
Malaya and the surrounding area to insure the countries could provide their own security.
In 1961 the United Kingdom along with the Malaya Prime Minister Abdul Rahman Putra
proposed the formation o f a Malaysian Federation, which would include Malaya,
Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei, and would create an economic and
strategic power structure in the South Pacific. Indonesia President Sukarno opposed the
federation. A conflict, termed the “Confrontation”, soon developed between Sukarno and
the Malaysian and British military forces. Because Britain became involved in the
“Confrontation”, Australia was also persuaded to contribute a battalion which drained its

^ Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia. 1961-1965: Britain, the United States and
the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-12.
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military budget and left its military forces over committed. This conflict consumed
British forces into the late 1960s and became a source of bitterness between Washington
and London. The Americans refused to assist the British with the Confrontation while
pushing Britain for assistance in Vietnam. The British argued that if they were expected
to carry the burden in Malaysia, the United States should do likewise in Vietnam.^^
Britain’s application to join the EEC also complicated its foreign policy re-alignment.
In 1963 Great Britain applied for membership in the EEC. Its application was initially
denied because of overly close British relations with the United States. Washington
seemed to recognize the British need to lessen its reliance in the United States and to
approve a policy that promised to strengthen the European economy and alleviate some
of the burden for America. Ironically, this move worried the other Commonwealth
members because it placed their preferred trading status with Britain in jeopardy.

British Response to More Flags
By the time the Labour Party regained control of Parliament in 1964, Britain had lost
international influence as well as experienced a deterioration in its the relationship with
the United States. Prime Minister Harold Wilson faced the task of rebuilding the Labour
majority while contending with public and official opposition to his policy of
simultaneously defending American action in Vietnam and calling for negotiations.
Many backbenchers and left-wing members of the Labour Party pushed Wilson to
disassociate the United Kingdom from all American actions and to condemn American
escalation and bombing during the first half of 1965. Washington continued to pressure
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the Wilson Government to make a more visible military contribution.’^*’ Wilson was
dedicated to securing the “special relationship” while finding alternatives to fighting in
the conflict. Ultimately, however, Wilson did not dictate poliey. He eventually responded
to domestic pressures and declining international status and turned his back on the
“special relationship” with the United States. He exerted British independence by
refusing to publicly back the United States with troops for Vietnam.
When Washington began to solicit more flags, London’s shifting policy became
glaringly clear. In response to his orders to press for more British aid on July 10, 1964,
American Ambassador to Britain David Bruce discussed US needs with London. Bruce
was told that the Britain should not have to contribute to Vietnam because o f its role as
Co-Chair o f the 1954 Geneva Convention and because they were assuming an anti
communist responsibility in Malaysia without U.S. support. Britain appeared willing to
increase its police training force upon GVN request because this would not conflict with
British responsibilities under the Geneva Conference. However, London emphasized that
it was taking on the burden of Malaysia without Washington’s assistance and therefore
London should not be required to support American action in Vietnam. Britain contended
it had “exercised restraint in not requesting U.S. [to] show its flag in Malaysia” and that
London, “would not regard resumption of US aid to Indonesia as proper quid pro quo for
UK assistance to US effort in Vietnam.”’*”
By August 1964, Britain had provided a five-man advisory mission on
counterinsurgency, a £56,000 grant for road building, and agreed to furnish additional
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police training advisors. When pressed for further assistance, London reiterated its
responsibility as Co-chair of the Geneva Conference and its considerable aid to Malaysia
and Laos.’°^ Given the British response to US overtures in May 1964, Secretary o f State
Rusk judged the United Kingdom “preoccupied with Malaysia” and unable to consider
anything above the “possibility of providing additional counter-insurgency advisors.” '*’^
He decided no more assistance would he forthcoming and it was best not to push for
more commitment at that time.
On August 6, 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the Wilson Government
issued a statement supporting the US actions as consistent with the right of self-defense
and expressed British determination to “assist reducing the international tension that has
inevitably resulted from these North Vietnamese attacks.”’*’'* Washington mistakenly
took this message as a sign of London’s changing attitude and lobbied for more
assistance. Another series o f overtures were made to London between August and
December, but Prime Minister Wilson would go no further than offering to approach the
Soviet Union about to re-opening the Geneva talks to help bring an end to the escalating
hostilities. Johnson chose to delay the Prime Minister for as long as possible in an attempt
to avoid peace talks until Saigon could enter than from a stronger strategic position.’**^
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Telegram Circular to Embassy From Rusk, May 18, 1964, NSF, COF: Vietnam, box 4, Folder 6, doc. 8,
LBJL.
Telegram from AmEmbassy London to White House, August 6, 1964, NSF, COF: UK, box 206, vol. 1,
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Following the Viet Cong attacks on an American marine hase in Pleiku on Febmary
6, 1964, Wilson contacted Moscow proposing that the Soviet Union and Great Britain
work together to reconvene the Geneva conventions before the fighting intensified. The
Prime Minister received no reply. On Febmary 20, 1965, he urged the Soviets to join
Britain in inviting the Geneva participants to assess proposals for a new settlement. This
overture received a response on March 15, 1965 in which the Soviets issued their
“routine denunciation o f the United States and a renewed call for the withdrawal o f all
American forces and equipment.” The next day the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko arrived in London for prescheduled bilateral talks. In several meetings with
Prime Minister Wilson and British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, Gromyko refused
any proposal to reinstitute the Geneva Conference until all air attacks in Vietnam ceased
and until all parties agreed to involve China.
British attempts to re-open the Geneva Conference may have been futile from the
beginning. In a memorandum that Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy prepared
for the President in Febmary 1965, he recommended the United States should resist
negotiations as long as possible. He pointed out that the pressure to negotiate was coming
from the United Nations and from individual countries such as the United Kingdom and
the Soviet Union. He believed that Washington should do everything possible to keep the
matter out of the United Nations. If Vietnam were brought before the Security Council,
America would be forced to respond. By contrast, when working through a third country
proposal such as the British overture, Washington could resist as long as possible by
“making clear our objectives and our willingness to work out a constmctive solution,” but
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prolonging the actual negotiations by asserting that “the Communist side is simply not
ready to negotiate on reasonable terms.” Bundy believed any conference resulting from
the British initiative could he “held off entirely for some weeks” and that if the United
States conceded to the pressures for talks, it would still have several weeks to stall while
the format o f the conferences was negotiated.'*” There was also great concern that any
peace initiative involving neutralization of Vietnam with American withdrawal would
result in a Communist takeover of the South because Saigon was virtually paralyzed and
the National Liberation Front (NLF) had gained too much control over the rural areas for
the weakened South Vietnamese to defend.'*’^
By following Bundy’s suggestions, Johnson gave Wilson the impression that America
supported his efforts. The Prime Minister was encouraged to approach the Soviets and
when Council Chairman Alexei Kosygin refused to reply, Wilson’s approach was
dropped. The lack of positive response from the Soviets and Hanoi allowed the
Americans to claim that the North Vietnamese were not willing to negotiate. The US
negotiating strategy was more likely intended to pacify public anti-war sentiments and to
avoid international pressure to involve the United Nations which might take actions
contrary to American objectives. This policy placed the British in a precarious situation
and ultimately caused the Wilson Government to lose international credibility.
While the United States placated the British in their futile attempts at peace
negotiations, Washington continued to solicit British help on the ground in Vietnam. On
March 5, 1965, Ambassador David Bruce reported a meeting he had with the Prime
Checklist o f Diplomatic Actions to Accompany Proposed Course of Action, Bundy to the President,
February 9, 1965, NSF, COF: Vietnam, box 13, Folder 4, Doc. 224b, LBJL.
William Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New York: McGrawHill, Inc., 1995), 172-75.
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Minister Wilson and British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart in which the two
expressed the growing concern in the Labour Party over Vietnam. It was the majority
sentiment that another initiative toward negotiations would strengthen the Wilson
Government’s resolve to back the U.S. policy both internally and in the public
perception. They argued that further exploration by the British Government, while
unlikely to receive a satisfactory response from Hanoi, would improve both governments'
standings in the international community and alleviate some of the internal pressure
Wilson was facing.'*’^
On March 23, 1965, Foreign Secretary Stewart visited Washington to discuss
Vietnam. He first questioned the reported use of napalm and nerve gas in Vietnam by the
South Vietnamese and Americans and warned its unpopularity could result in the loss of
world support. The discussion then turned to opening negotiations and the utility of
making a public statement to the effect that the United States was willing to return to the
negotiating table.” *’
The American Embassy in London hosted fourteen new Labor MP’s on March 24,
1965, for a discussion on Vietnam. Led by Eric Heifer, they expressed the hard left-wing
opinion that the United States had “no business in Asia” and that they felt the use of
nerve gas and napalm was immoral. Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury Edward
Short told the Ambassador that an increasing number of Labor MP’s were urging
dissociation from the United States due to what they perceived as “lack of evidence that
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US is willing to negotiate.” Short asserted that Washington should “take a more positive
attitude on negotiations.'”
The Vietnam War was also a topic of the April 1, 1965, Parliamentary Debates.
Wilson found it surprisingly easy to contain the left-wing anti-war opposition, with only a
few backbenchers questioning the use o f chemical weapons by the Americans. Most who
spoke that day expressed support for U.S. defense of Vietnam and were quick to compare
what the Americans were doing in Vietnam to what the United Kingdom was doing in
Malaysia. American Embassy officials attributed this pro-American sentiment to
extensive British press coverage of the bombing of the US embassy in Saigon in late
March which killed two US personnel.” ^
These collective arguments were representative of majority Labour Party opinion and
pushed Wilson toward disassociation from the United States. There was, however, an
opposite influence coming from the Office of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Affairs staff
argued for a continued pro-American policy. They believed that the “special relationship”
should be salvaged at all costs since ties to America provided Britain’s most important
source of power. Given these conflicting pressures, Wilson decided to propose still
another peace initiative while denying troops to the Americans. This two-pronged
strategy would keep the opposition busy. As he confided to Richard Crossman, “My
strategy is to put the Tories on the defensive and always give them awkward choices.”"^
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Prime Minister Wilson’s frustration with the conflicting attitudes in Parliament was
only compounded as his relationship with President Johnson began to deteriorate. As
early as February 7, 1965 the two argued over Wilson’s refusal to send troops to
Vietnam. Johnson believed that Wilson had no right to become involved in any peace
process if he were unwilling to participate in the fight. Wilson, in turn, felt he had no
choice in not sending troops given his domestic situation and believed that he and the
government could still he effective mediators if the Americans kept them informed. This
led to increasing tensions at meetings between Wilson and the President and his cabinet
members.” '*
This troubled personal relationship provided another incentive for Wilson to publicly
oppose US actions in Vietnam. Many o f Wilson’s contemporaries have argued that he
wanted to establish himself as a great international statesman, comparable to Winston
Churchill or Harold MacMillan. They believed that Wilson was more concerned with
becoming an important partner to the United States than with the peace process. Some
officials were frustrated with Wilson’s preoccupation with grandeur. Minister of Housing
Richard Crossman expressed his, “disillusionment with his [Wilson] gimmickry” and his
belief that the Prime Minister needed to commit to a “real job of work based on a real
strategy.”” ^ Based on Wilson’s own accounts of meetings with President Johnson and
observations by others, the Prime Minister believed that his abilities and influence were
greater than they really were.
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Wilson’s interaction with the far more aggressive Johnson did little to improve his
personal situation or Britain’s international standing. By openly defying the wishes o f the
President, Wilson, along with his Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, believed he could
present an image of a strong and independent leader who was not easily controlled by the
United States. Wilson recounts several meetings with Washington officials in which his
and Stewart’s open opposition ostensibly changed the attitudes of key officials. One such
instance occurred on March 22, 1965, when Foreign Secretary Stewart met with
Secretary of State Rusk and later with President Johnson. Stewart was sent to argue
against escalating the war and for negotiations. Wilson claimed in his memoirs, “With his
firm, persuasive and often underrated authority, he had a marked effect in ... steering
American thinking away from negative attitudes to negotiations.”” ®
Given President Johnson’s perception of Harold Wilson, Stewart’s influence was
overstated. LB J was continually upset with the Prime Minister for not assisting in the war
and showed open disdain for the man on a personal level. Johnson based his sense of
Wilson as untrustworthy in part on information and opinions furnished by Washington
officials. The CIA opined that Wilson might be an “untrustworthy” person who was
committed to the special relationship “based solely on sentiment.”” ^ Johnson also had a
preconceived dislike for British Prime Ministers after a misunderstanding with Prime
Minister Douglas-Home in 1964. Wilson, himself, expressed concern with Johnson’s
attitude when recounting a discussion with the President in which he was told that
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Johnson, “would never trust a British Prime Minister again.”"* These opinions did not
help the two establish a friendly personal relationship and, as Wilson’s actions began to
conflict with President Johnson’s goals, the President’s opinion of the Prime Minister
deteriorated further.
Yet with the collapse of the personal relationship between Wilson and Johnson and
the apparent lack of support for the “special relationship” that these events portrayed,
there were still many members of the British Government that clung to the idea o f a bond
between the nations. As Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart argued in 1965, “I say we
have on these occasions expressed differences, but I want to warn you (if it is necessary
to do so) against the attitude of mind which regards disagreeing with the United States as
a desirable thing in itself.” Fie feared that the Vietnam situation would break down the
relationship and he saw that as a detriment to Great Britain’s hope of remaining a world
power. He believed, “We do recognize them as our friends and our allies, ... I have made
this point because it is a clearly stated part of our Party policy that we want not merely to
remain in but to strengthen the Atlantic alliance and I am sure we are right to do that.”'
Even with the strained relationship between the Prime Minister and the President,
Wilson continued to pursue diplomatic initiatives for peace. At the June 18-20, 1965,
Commonwealth Conference, Wilson proposed a Commonwealth peace mission
consisting o f four Prime Minister’s who would visit various national capitals- most
importantly Washington, Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, Saigon, and the three ICC member’s
capitals- to present opposing views on Vietnam and a proposal for the ending of
118

Wilson, A Personal Record. 46.

119

Labour Party, Report o f the Sixty-Fifth Annual Conference. 180-81 ; “Britain and the United States,” in
Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: the Enduring Alliance, ed. John Baylis (New York: Manchester
University Press, 1997), 161.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67

hostilities. The objective o f the mission was to secure a withdrawal of all foreign military
from the North and the South, neutralize the area, establish an international peace force
under the auspices of the Geneva Agreements, and present guidelines for the eventual
reunification of Vietnam. Wilson’s proposal was ambitious but ultimately never came to
fruition because of the divergent views of the Commonwealth members on the Vietnam
War and their support or opposition to American policy.’^® Prime Minister Wilson also
kept open the line of communication with the Soviets throughout the remainder of 1965
and again in the spring o f 1966 without any response.
Domestic discontent with US actions in Vietnam and London’s policy o f support
reached a peak on June 29, 1966, after the Americans bombed the city of Hanoi and the
port of Haiphong. Public outcry arose immediately and the Leftist members of the Labour
party responded by strongly urging Wilson to disassociate the government from the
United States. In Resolution No. 22 presented by Member of Parliament A. Kitson at the
1966 Labour Party Conference, leftist members wanted the conference to publicly,
“condemn American intervention in South-East Asia,” and urged the government to
announce that it “cannot give any support to unilateral action by any country using
military force to interfere in the internal politics of other states.”'^' A second proposal.
Resolution No. 32, urged the conference to, “call upon the Government to dissociate
itself from American policies and military operations in Vietnam.” The resolution
explained that, “We say that unless we are seen not to he supporting all the policies and
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military operations of America in Vietnam we are inhibited from playing our part as
mediator for peace in that situation.”*^^
The bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong even prompted one of the America’s biggest
supporters within the Labour Government, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, to speak
out. At the 1966 Labour Party Conference, Stewart took “the view that while we are and
are glad to be the friends and allies of the United States we should be prepared, when we
believe the importance of the issue warrants it, to state differences of opinion frankly and
cordially as between friends and allies.”

While he was not as emphatic that the

government should distance itself from the United States, it was clear that he too believed
that the government had no choice but to publicly state its disapproval of the US actions.
Wilson responded with a statement in Parliament the following day that while he still
supported America’s general policy in Vietnam, “we should, nevertheless, feel bound to
re-affirm that we must dissociate ourselves from an action of this kind.”'^'* Parliament
and the British populace welcomed Wilson’s condemnation of American actions but
public protest o f the war still expanded. Wilson, still convinced that he could bring the
United States and Hanoi through the Soviets to the negotiating table, continued to pursue
diplomatic opportunities when they were presented.
The next opportunity came in February 1967 when he submitted another peace
proposal to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. In January, Washington had launched Project
Sunflower, a direct approach to Hanoi through the North Vietnamese embassy in
Moscow to bring both sides to the negotiating table. Johnson proposed what he called the
Labour Party, Report o f the Sixtv-Fifth Annual Conference. 184-85.
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Phase A-Phase B plan in which Washington agreed to stop bombing unconditionally in
Phase A and then both sides would take mutual steps o f de-escalation in Phase B. When
the approach through the embassy produced no results, Johnson sent a letter directly to
President Ho Chi Mihn in which he modified the Phase A-Phase B formula leaving a
time lag between the bombing halt and the end o f North Vietnamese infiltrations.'^^
Prime Minister Wilson entered the talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin on February 6,
1967, under the reluctant approval of Washington and presented the original Phase APhase B plan to Moscow without the knowledge that President Johnson had already
submitted a revised version to Hanoi. After a week of negotiations, Wilson convinced
Kosygin to relay the original plan to the North Vietnamese. The Soviet Premier realized
he had been given two differing written offers, one directly from the President o f the
United States and the other from the uninformed Prime Minister Wilson.'^^ When the
Johnson administration discovered that both messages had been forwarded, the President
demanded that Wilson’s proposal be retracted and the Prime Minister’s credibility was
lost. After the incident, it was discovered that both Wilson and Johnson were to blame
for the failure o f Project Sunflower. Washington had delayed informing London of the
changes to the Phase A-Phase B plan until after the Prime Minister had presented the
offer to the Soviets and Prime Minister Wilson had been so eager to bring the Soviets into
the negotiations that he had neglected to discuss his statements with Washington prior to
forwarding it to Kosygin. These futile overtures made the British Government look
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increasingly ineffective in the international arena and eventually led the Prime Minister to
surrender his diplomatic agenda.
In the end, the Wilson Government was forced to step away from the peace process,
disassociate itself from the actions of the United States and accept its position as being
too weak to affect the peace process. As it worked out, Britain was so far out o f the
process that they had no input whatsoever when the decisive Paris Peace talks o f 19721973 finally took place. Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States was not
permanently damaged but by disassociating itself from American actions in Vietnam,
London was able to gain entrance into the European Economic Community in 1973 and
begin a Euro-centric shift in foreign and economic policy that would last until the 1980s.
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CHAPTER 4

CANADA AND THE VIETNAM WAR
Canada’s relationship with and reliance on the United States differed greatly from its
Commonwealth partners. Canadian Prime Ministers Lester Pearson and Minister of
External affairs Paul Martin openly agreed with the American objective of stopping
communist aggression in South Vietnam but were unable to help militarily in the
intervention. Although Ottawa had been providing economic and non-combatant aid to
South Vietnam for nearly two decades, Canada was prohibited from an active military
role due to its membership in the International Control Commission (ICC). Once
Washington began its more flags campaign, Canada was not placed under the same
pressure to commit troops as the other Commonwealth members.
President Johnson was aware of the restriction accompanying Canada’s membership
in the ICC. Canada was appointed a member of the ICC in 1954 as a part of the Geneva
Agreements. This role completely prohibited any Canadian combat involvement in
Vietnam by making the ICC responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the
agreement. Unlike Britain’s claim that its sponsorship of the Geneva conferences blocked
its combat involvement, Canada was actually prohibited by international agreement from
intervening. This relieved Prime Minister Pearson of the personal pressure Johnson
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continually exerted on British Prime Minister Wilson and also allowed Ottawa a level of
independence from Washington in formulating its own Vietnam policy.
This freedom also derived from Canada’s geopolitical security. Sharing a border with
the United States and being located directly between America and the Eastern borders of
the Soviet Union made Canada a major security concern for Washington. Knowing that
an attack on Canada could be the first step toward an attack against the United States and
that any military maneuvers against the eastern side of the Soviet Union would require
American use of Canadian air space and territory led Americans to conclude that
Canadian security was as important as American security. By the early 1960s, Canada
was a member of the North Atlantic Security Alliance and had agreed to participate in
Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) under the supervision of the North American Air
Defense Command (NORAD). DEW was an early tracking and interception air defense
system created and used by the United States and located completely on Canadian soil. It
was intended to insure American security against a Soviet air attack, but its operation also
required securing Canadian airspace. All of this meant that Canada was not in the same
vulnerable predicament as Australia. While Australia wanted Washington’s help in
Southeast Asia to increase security in its region, the United States wanted Canadian help
to secure its own region.
While this geopolitical reality allowed Canada a degree of independence from the
United States, it did not mean that Canada was completely free of any American pressure
over Vietnam. Johnson may not have been able to bully Canada for military assistance
because o f the ICC but he could use Canada’s diplomatic relationship with Hanoi to his
advantage. It became apparent to Washington that Canada was most useful as a
' Annette Baker Fox, The Politics o f Atttaction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 75-76.
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negotiating conduit between the United States and Hanoi, and the United States began to
use the Canadian representatives to relay offers of negotiation to Ho Chi Minh. The
Canadian representatives were also used to gain valuable information on North
Vietnamese movements and violations of the Geneva agreements. Canada’s diplomatic
access to Hanoi was invaluable to the United States, and it was important to use Canada’s
position without compromising Ottawa’s integrity within the ICC. Any pressure on
Ottawa to provide combat forces would have jeopardized its relationship with Hanoi.

Canadian ICC Membership
Canadian utility to the United States began long before that of Australia or Great
Britain. As part of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, Canada was appointed as one of the
three members of the International Control Commission. The ICC was an international
oversight body created at the Geneva Conference to guarantee the French evacuation
from Vietnam and the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces to their respective sides of the
seventeenth parallel. The members of the Commission employed inspection teams to
observe the implementation of the provisions and to investigate any complaints of
misconduct by either side. If the inspection team could not resolve a complaint, then a
full complaint would be forwarded to the Commission which made a ruling by majority
vote and recommended a solution to the dispute. The final duty o f the Commission was to
supervise the nationwide elections scheduled for 1956.'^^
Canada was placed in the ICC to represent Western interests and as a counter weight
to the Polish membership which represented Soviet and Eastern Bloc interests. India was
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the third, “neutral” member and the chair of the Commission. Because the Canadian
member was seen as the Western representative, Washington believed that it could
employ Ottawa to legitimate its actions in Vietnam. When Washington decided that the
1956 elections should not be held. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles consulted
Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and they agreed that the
Canadians would contend that the actions of the Viet Minh and not South Vietnam had
been responsible.*^^
Throughout the remainder o f the 1950s, Canada continued to meet its responsibility
to the ICC. By far the most American-friendly member of the Commission, Canada tried
to remain as neutral in its decisions as possible. But Canada’s membership soon became a
double-edged sword. Through its ICC participation, Ottawa was able to gain valuable
information on North Vietnamese actions and to function as an advocate for American
and Vietnamese position. Canada’s diplomatic access to areas in the North also provided
Washington with information on Hanoi’s activities which the United States would not
have otherwise had.
To maintain diplomatic integrity in the eyes of the North Vietnamese, Canadian
delegates were often forced to find in the North’s favor in the investigations. Between
1954 and 1965, the Canadian delegation supported the South Vietnamese and Americans
in only 53 percent of its decisions while Poland, the Eastern Bloc representative which
was not being threatened with loss of access to the South, sided with the North
Vietnamese in 84 percent of its decisions. This voting record placed a strain on the
relationship between Washington and Ottawa. Many in Washington wanted Canada to

Edelgard Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, Invisible and Inaudible in Washington: American Policies
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cite more North Vietnamese infractions of the Geneva Accords and to keep the American
infractions out of the findings. Canada was unable to help the Americans to the extent
that Washington wished because, as one Indian delegate explained, the American
violations were so obvious that the Commission had no choice but acknowledge them
while the Communist’s infractions were much more subtle. Increasing quantities of U.S.
material and advisory troops arrived in South Vietnams through the ports in Saigon
where the ICC delegations to the South were stationed. In contrast. North Vietnamese
were infiltrating into the South through the jungles and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail
which were far less accessible to the Commission investigators.*^**
In a June 1962 ICC report, the Commission found that the North had violated the
Geneva agreements by transporting “armed and unarmed personnel, arms, and munitions
and other supplies” from the North to the South “with the object of supporting,
organizing and carrying out hostile activities.” It also found South Vietnam in violation
for “receiving the increased military aid from the United States” and the “introduction of
a large number of U.S. Military personnel beyond the stated strength” which amounted to
a “factual military alliance, which is prohibited under ... the Geneva Agreements.”*^* By
finding both sides in violation, the ICC showed how its authority over the parties was
contingent on its ability to placate each side and resulted in diminished access to each
zone. Canada maintained its diplomatic relationship with Hanoi which proved both useful
and frustrating to the United States. The Canadian ICC delegation often informed
Washington and Saigon of the content of discussions at the Commission meetings and
gave the Americans information and findings that were not included in the ICC Reports.
Mahant, Invisible and Inaudible in Washington. 50-54.
Bridle, Behind the Headlines. 17-18.
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This information helped Washington formulate both military strategy and its negotiations
proposals.
Canada ultimately became disillusioned with the ICC’s lack of any real power to
control or monitor the actions of the opposing sides. By the spring of 1963 when the
Pearson Government took office, a majority o f Canadian Parliament members were ready
to resign from the ICC and distance themselves from the unpopular American policy.
Others in the administration supported the American resolve to stop communist
insurgents and decided to increase Canadian diplomatie assistance. When serious
hostilities broke out with U.S. bombing of the North following the Gulf of Tonkin
incident, the ICC was completely removed from the North and greatly restricted in the
South since neither of Hanoi nor Saigon could ensure the safety of the ICC
representatives. Not until 1972 would the ICC again have any real efficacy in
Vietnam.

Canadian Assistance to the More Flags Campaign
With the initiation of the more flags campaign. President Johnson and Secretary Rusk
began to examine potential Canadian usefulness. Secretary Rusk met with Canadian
Prime Minister Pearson and Minister of External Affairs Paul Martin in late April 1964
and proposed using Canada’s new ICC Commissioner, Blair Seaborn, to convey
messages to Hanoi regarding Washington’s intensions and to act as an intermediary in
negotiations. Rusk intended to use Seaborn to convey America’s “determination to see
things through” but to stress that Washington “wants no military bases or other footholds
in South Vietnam or Laos.” Rusk also proposed that Seaborn use his access to determine
Bridle, Behind the Headlines. 17-18.
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how much pressure or backing the Chinese were providing Ho Chi Minh and whether he
“considers himself over-extended and exposed.”
On May 28, 1964, President Johnson and Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson
met at the New York Hilton Hotel and discussed the possible Seaborn mission. The
Prime Minister assured Johnson that Canada “agreed on the importance of sending Mr.
Seaborn to Vietnam” and was eager “to have a Canadian officer play this important role
of reporting accurately the purposes of the United States Government and the meaning o f
any actions in which it might be involved.” The President responded that the United
States was grateful and declared that “the U.S. had no desire to threaten any government
in the area, and wanted nothing more than the restoration of peace in countries which
were now under attack from outside.”*
At that same time, the State Department Special Assistant on Vietnam William
Sullivan and Canadian Minister of External Affairs Martin also met to discuss the
possible Seaborn Mission and began finalizing the details. They agreed that Seaborn
“need not agree with or associate his government with the substance of some of the
messages he would be asked to transmit.”*
The final guidelines for the Seaborn mission were forwarded to the Canadian
Embassy on May 30, 1964. Seaborn was asked to transmit messages between
Washington and Hanoi verbatim regardless of his agreement or disagreement with the
Telegram From the Department o f State to the Embassy in Vietnam, Foreign Relations o f the United
States. 1968-1964, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Publication Office, 1992), 281-82.
Memorandum for the Record o f a Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson,
Hilton Hotel, New York, May 28, 1964 Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1968-1964, vol. 1
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publication Office, 1992), 394-95.
See footnote to Memorandum for the Record o f a Conversation between President Johnson and Prime
Minister Pearson, Hilton Hotel, N ew York, May 28, 1964 Foreign Relations o f the United States. 19681964, vol. 1 (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Publication Office, 1992), 394-95.
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content and was to be assured that the Canadian Government would not have to associate
itself with the messages. He was directed to observe the North Vietnamese for any signs
of internal struggles, tensions with the Soviets or China, and for signs of war weariness.
Most importantly. Seaborn was to relay Washington’s intention to “maintain the
independence and territorial integrity of South Viet-nam” and to warn that unless Hanoi
ceased all acts o f war within one week of the approach, “the United States will initiate
action by air and naval means against North Vietnam until Hanoi does agree.” If Hanoi
agreed, the United States would work to reopen trade with North Vietnam, provide
economic aid, extend diplomatic recognition and phase out U.S. forces in South Vietnam
over a one-year period.*^®
In Seaborn’s first mission to Hanoi on June 18, 1964, he met with North Vietnamese
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and delivered the American message. Pham “welcomed
the opening up o f the Channel” but also expressed his displeasure with the commando
raids being conducted by the United States and the South Vietnamese in Laos. Seabom’s
assessment o f Pham Van Dong’s reaction left him cautious but mildly encouraged.
Pham Van Dong then explained Ho Chi Minh’s position to Seaborn. His solution
required a complete American withdrawal from Indochina, a South Vietnamese
Government arranged by the people of the South including the National Liberation Front,
and a reunification o f the country without military intervention. The North Vietnamese
Prime Minister assured Seaborn that the people of Vietnam did not want the war to

Memorandum to Alexis Johnson; Instmction for Canadian Interlocutor with Hanoi, June 1, 1964, in,
The Secret Diplomacy o f the Vietnam War: The Negotiating volumes o f the Pentagon Papers, ed. George
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the United States. 1968-1964, vol. 1 (Washington, D C.: U.S. Government Publication Office, 1992), 52425.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79

intensify but would fight if required. He emphasized, “it is impossible for you Westerners
to understand the force o f the people’s will to resist and to continue.”'
Washington was disappointed with the North Vietnamese response and began looking
more closely at the possibility of military intervention. In his July 2,1964, circular
telegram the President increased the pressure for third country participation by directly
appealing to the countries for increased contributions.'^^ Canada was also concerned with
the apparent stalemate resulting from the initial mission. In response to Johnson’s pleas
for assistance. Department of External Affairs officials recommended to the Prime
Minister that Ottawa increase its current aid program to Vietnam by examining the
“shopping list” of supplies needed by the South Vietnamese to see what Canada could
supply without jeopardizing its ICC neutrality.
While working closely with Seaborn to propose peace negotiations with Hanoi, the
State Department was also pursuing the more flags campaign. In a June 15, 1964,
memorandum. Dean Rusk recognized that the Canadians were worried about increasing
any contributions to Vietnam because of the ICC. He also acknowledged the increasing
Canadian public opposition to U.S. action in Vietnam.'"*" In a July 10 assessment of third
country assistance by the State Department, Canadian contributions included a plan for

Telegram from State Department to AmEmbassy in Saigon, July 11, 1964, in Herring, Secret Diplomacy
o f the Vietnam War. 31-32.
Circular Telegram for the Ambassador from the President, July 2, 1964, NSF, COF; Vietnam, box 6,
Folder 2, doc. 45, LBJL.
Memorandum for the President; Third Country Aid to Vietnam, June 15, 1964, NSF, COF: Vietnam,
box 5, Folder 6, doc. 7, LBJL.
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additional aid to the University of Hue and an inereased number of Canadian
Government grants for Vietnamese students to study in Canada.'""
Discussion of a possible second mission was underway in late July and early August
when the Gulf o f Tonkin incident stiffened the Ameriean resolve. Seaborn arranged a
meeting with Pham Van Dong on August 13 and was instructed to convey that the
“Americans were at a complete loss to understand the DRV motive” in the attacks and
that the “only reasonable hypothesis was that North Vietnam was intent o n. . . provoking
the United States.” Seaborn was to clarify that the USS Maddox was not associated with
any attacks on the DRV and that Washington’s response “for the present will be limited
and fitting.” Further, the American “patience with North Vietnamese aggression is
growing extremely thin” and the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution re-affirmed
the determination o f the U.S. Government “to continue to oppose firmly.. DRV efforts to
subvert and conquer South Vietnam and Laos.” Finally, Seaborn was to warn Pham Van
Dong that “if the DRV persists in this present course, it can expect to continue to suffer
the consequences” because the United States possessed the “ways and means of
measuring the DRV’s participation in, and direct control of, the war on South Vietnam...
and would be carefully watching the DRV’s response.”'"*^ Following the meeting.
Seaborn notified Washington that Pham Van Dong had an “angry reaction” to this

State Department Circular Telegram: Third Country Aid to Vietnam, July 10, 1964, doc. 3 land
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catalog of US threats but Seaborn felt the North Vietnamese leader believed the channel
of eommunication should remain open.'"*^
The Gulf of Tonkin incident elicited concern in Ottawa, but also reinforced Canadian
resolve to support Washington. Canada decided to increase its non-military aid to South
Vietnam and also proposed another Seaborn mission. Contending that serious talks with
Hanoi were not possible under the eireumstanees, the United States resisted Canadian
advances until mid-Deeember.'"*"* Even then. Seaborn was given no new points to add to
the prior communication. The main purpose of his visit was to assess if the DRV had
changed its position from the previous summer and to reassert America’s determination
to assist the South Vietnamese.'"*^
Pearson and the Canadian Government were disappointed with Washington’s refusal
to use the opportunity to push harder for negotiations and became disillusioned with US
policy as they had with the ineffectiveness of the ICC. This bitterness was eompounded
after Prime Minister Pearson’s January 1965 trip to LBJ Raneh where President Johnson
introduced him to the press as Prime Minister Wilson and then entertained the entire
delegation with tours and dinners all the while avoiding any opportunity to discuss
Vietnam.
The Canadian leader’s disaffection was also apparent in their ambivalence regarding
the level of their aid to South Vietnam. By the Deeember 11, 1964, Canada had
contributed $1.5 million in educational, medical aid commodity assistance to South
Telegram from AmEmbassy in Ottawa to State Department, August 18, 1964, in Herring, The Secret
Diplomacy o f the Vietnam War, 34-35.
Greg Donaghy, Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States 1963-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
Uniyersity Press, 2002), 126-27.
Telegram from State Department to AmEmbassy in Ottawa, December 3, 1964, in Herring, The Secret
Diplomacy o f the Vietnam War. 37.
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Vietnam. National Security Council Staff member Michael Forrestal deemed Canada a
“poor candidate for additional signifieant help for political reasons.” Therefore, Ottawa
should not be solicited again for assistance because of their ICC membership. He also
warned that Ottawa might withdraw from the ICC and Southeast Asia because “they are
in a sour mood.”'"*"
Following the initiation o f Rolling Thunder bombing campaign in February 1965,
Prime Minister Pearson came under growing pressure from international sources, such as
Indian Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri and United Nations Secretary General U
Thant, to use his influence as a close Washington ally to convince President Johnson that
force would not yield negotiations. The Prime Minister also received domestic pressure
from several sources—such as External Affairs Under Secretary Escott Reid, intellectuals
and students, younger members of the Liberal Party, and even his wife and son—to speak
out against the bombing. Pearson began to agree and voiced this shifting position in a
February 10, 1965, speech. He criticized the escalating American involvement indirectly
by urging the use of quiet diplomacy. He acknowledged North Vietnamese aggression
against the Saigon, but criticized US involvement in the South where it “seems to have
found no solid basis of support through a South Vietnam Government of strength and
popularity.”'"*’
This speech was the first real evidence of Canadian disapproval with the United
States actions in Vietnam, but it would not be the last. As the use of napalm and nerve
gas became widely publicized, the Canadian public increased pressure on Ottawa to
Memorandum for the President: Third Country Assistance to Vietnam, December 11, 1964, NSF, COF:
Vietnam, Box 11, folder 2, doc. 173, LBJL.
Copy o f Prime Minister Pearson’s Speech at the Canadian Club in Ottawa, Febmary 10, 1965, NSF,
COF: Canada, box 165, folder 10, doc. 42a, LBJL. See also Donaghy, Tolerant Allies. 127-29.
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distance itself from the Americans. Pearson incorporated the idea o f using a bombing halt
to encourage Hanoi to come to the negotiating tables in a speech he delivered at Temple
University on April 2, 1965. While portraying US intervention as being one o f honorable
defense at the request of the South Vietnamese, Pearson made clear that he believed the
extensive bombing should have had its intended effect of warning the North o f US
resolve. Therefore, he suggested, “a measured and announced pause in one field of
military action at the right time might facilitate the development of diplomatic resources
which cannot easily be applied to the problem under the existing circumstances.” '"**
President Johnson was outraged by these speeches and made that very clear to the
Prime Minister the following day at Camp David. After purposely ignoring Pearson for
over an hour, Johnson led him out to the garden where he berated the Prime Minister for
undercutting the US position. He was offended that Pearson had not discussed the speech
with the White House for prior approval and that he had given the speech at an American
university knowing that the President had been receiving great criticism from the
universities.*"*" The Prime Minister tried to smooth over the offense in a letter upon his
return to Ottawa. He expressed Canada’s intention to support American policy in
Vietnam but admitted that his government was increasingly apprehensive that
Washington was headed in the wrong direction in Vietnam and he was therefore
compelled to suggest a possible pause. Pearson stressed that his speech called for only a
limited pause “at the right time” and that he believed that such an act would strengthen
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the President’s position diplomatically.*"" Although the letter was accepted in
Washington, the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister was never
mended. As the Americans moved toward a full combat commitment in June, Canadians
continued to pursue diplomatic alternatives. Two more diplomatic missions would be
undertaken before it became clear to Ottawa that negotiations were not soon to come.
As America escalated its involvement throughout the summer of 1965, domestic and
international pressure mounted on Pearson to move Washington toward negotiation. The
Prime Minister notified Johnson that he was available to quietly pursue negotiations. He
saw an opportunity during the 1965 Christmas bombing pause. Pearson and Secretary of
State for External Affairs Paul Martin proposed sending retired Canadian Ambassador to
China Chester A. Ronning on a mission to Hanoi to promote talks between the
combatants. Washington reluctantly approved the mission despite the suspicion most
American officials, such as William Bundy and Dean Rusk, held for Ronning, who was
openly critical of American Asian policy.*"*
The initial meeting occurred on March 7-11,1966, after complications with travel
visas to China and Hanoi held up the mission. Ronning met with several North
Vietnamese officials including foreign minister Nguyen Duy Trinh but gained no
movement on the North Vietnamese position that American acceptance of the Four Points
was the only basis for a peaceful settlement. Ronning then met with Pham Van Dong who
reluctantly indicated that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) would enter into
some form o f preliminary meetings if the United States agreed to cease bombing and
combat exercises against the North. Pham further added that the North had already
150
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offered this in a January 4, 1966, letter to Washington. President Johnson and Secretary
Rusk were not enthusiastic about the response. The January letter had indicated that only
after the Americans agreed to the National Liberation Front’s Four Points, would Hanoi
agree to negotiations. Rusk feared Hanoi would interpret a bombing halt as US agreement
to the Four Points and refused to give the Canadians a reply for Hanoi. External Affairs
Minister Martin persistently urged the United States to respond until Washington agreed
to a second Ronning mission.
Ronning was sent to Hanoi again on June 14, 1966, with the message that
Washington was willing to talk without conditions, to de-escalate mutually, or to
communicate with Hanoi via intermediaries but was not prepared to accept the Four
Points proposal. He also carried instruction unknown to Washington. External Affairs
Minister Martin directed Ronning to “advance the process” by requesting Pham Van
Dong’s interpretation of the third of the Four Points, which stated that South Vietnam’s
problems should be settled by the people without outside interference, and whether
further exchanges on this point could be made. Martin believed that the Canadians could
negotiate a more liberal North Vietnamese stance on this issue as a way to encourage the
Americans to take a more flexible stance on the Four Points.*"^
The second Ronning mission produced no results. He was told that Pham Van Dong
was not available and the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh
expressed only disappointment in the message.*"* The mission also had repercussions in
Canada. Shortly before Ronning left for Hanoi, Prime Minister Pearson learned that
Johnson and his advisors had authorized bombing strikes in Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor.
Donaghy, Tolerant Allies. 138-39; Herring, Secret Diplomacy o f the Vietnam War. 163-65.
Herring, Secret Diplomacy o f the Vietnam War. 165.
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Pearson and his advisors also discovered that Washington had sent a message through
Peking of Ronning's upcoming visit and had expressed American willingness to suspend
the bombing in exchange for a halt in the North’s infiltration of the South as terms for
negotiations. This message contained far more lenient terms than the message
Washington sent through Ronning. Canadian official felt that the Americans expected the
Canadian diplomat would receive a negative response and intended to use it as
justification to gain public support for the approved bombing escalation.’""*
The rift caused by the Ronning mission was only a symptom of a larger disagreement
between the two countries over Vietnam. Canadian public support for American policy
in Vietnam was down to 34 percent by May 1966 and the growing numbers o f American
draft-resisters crossing the border to Canada were adding to the anti-American sentiment.
A delegation of faculty members from the University o f Toronto’s Victoria College was
also exciting controversy for the Pearson Government by questioning the Defense
Production Agreement between the United States and Canada in which Canadian
produced military supplies were being sold to America and subsequently used in
Vietnam.
President Johnson decided to visit New Brunswick in August 1966 in an attempt to
salvage the deteriorating relationship. Prime Minister Pearson and External Affairs
Minister Martin agreed with the President that the two governments had disagreements
but would approach the problem of Vietnam together. This agreement calmed the
tensions for a few months, but by January 1967 the public discontent with Vietnam began
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to rise again and the Pearson Government faced new criticism that the ICC members
were acting as US informants and not as international civil servants.’""
Canada finally broke with the United States over Vietnam for several reasons.
Domestic opposition to American Vietnam policy and Canadian support for those
policies threatened the Pearson Government’s electoral prospects. Ottawa disagreed with
the ongoing American escalation of hostilities because many officials feared that a
protracted war would undermine American resolve to combat communism in other, more
important places.’"" Finally, Pearson’s support of American actions in Vietnam and his
assistance in forwarding Washington’s diplomatic proposals began jeopardizing
Canadian credibility as a member of the International Control Commission and as an
independent international diplomat. This contributed to Pearson losing the 1968 election
and Pierre Elliott Trudeau replacing him as Prime Minister.
Trudeau opposed Canada’s existing foreign policy o f “quiet diplomacy” and reliance
on the “special relationship” with the United States. He began reorganizing the
Department o f External Affairs, reducing Canadian commitments to NATO and the
Atlantic alliance, and openly questioned the war in Vietnam. The Prime Minister
encouraged draft evaders from America and publicly urged an end to the war. His
relationship with the newly elected President Richard M. Nixon suffered greatly because
of his anti-war attitude and his insistence that Canada extend diplomatic recognition to
communist China. With the Vietnam war still growing despite of Nixon’s
“Vietnamization” policy, Trudeau faced public disapproval of Canadian alliance with the
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United States and lost his majority in the 1972 elections. In response, the Canadian
Parliament under the Prime Minister’s direction passed a resolution against the war in
January 1973. The Canadian government agreed to serve on the ICSC constituted in 1973
but would no longer support American actions in Vietnam.'"’

John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (Athens:
The University o f Georgia Press, 2002), 248-52.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION
The more flags campaign had little success. By June 1965, when President Lyndon
Johnson committed full combat forces to Vietnam, the only Commonwealth nations to
join the Americans were Australia and New Zealand. While the more flags campaign
garnered greater success with other American allies, such as South Korea and the
Philippines, the campaign revealed the strained relations between the United States and
its traditional Commonwealth allies.
By the summer of 1964, Washington faced the inevitability that if the United States
were going to stave off communist victory in South Vietnam, American troops would
have to be engaged. The Johnson administration knew that such a policy could have
negative consequences affecting not only the administration’s popularity, but also its
ability to pursue its domestic reform agenda. The more flags campaign sought to create
the impression that Washington’s actions were well supported and much wanted. It was
never the intent of Johnson or his administration to establish a multilateral coalition in
which the United States was just one of the participants. Washington meant to control the
war in Vietnam and only solicited military support for public relations purposes. As the
more flags campaign foundered and the frustration in the White House grew, the push for
allies had the opposite effect. The more the administration pushed, the more America’s

89
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traditional allies disapproved military involvement. In the end, rifts between the capitals
widened and relationships between the leaders disintegrated.
Each Commonwealth country was experiencing a period of readjustment; each faced
economic, political and social changes that forced re-examinations o f its own
international relationships. At the same time, they confronted the struggle in Vietnam and
Washington’s insistence that her allies faithfully support American policy. American’s
fear of communism and its containment policy directed Washington’s attention to
Southeast Asia. London’s need to improve its economic position and end post-colonial
burdens drove Britain away from Southeast Asia. Caught in the middle were Australia,
whose security relied directly on the security of the region, and Canada, which was
inescapably entangled in Vietnam through its membership in the ICC.
Like the Johnson administration, most American allies faced internal dissention over
the war. Britain and Canada experienced public opposition to the war and to the methods
that the United States used to wage the conflict. As President Johnson well knew, losing
public favor could adversely affect one’s policy goals and even career. British Prime
Minister Wilson and Canadian Prime Minister Pearson could ill afford to entangle
themselves in an unpopular war in a region of little or no significance to their countries.
Even though the United States was willing to fight in Vietnam out of fear of losing
another country as had ostensibly happened with China, it did not follow that the
Commonwealth members should do the same. They had other problems to address, and
for Canada and the United Kingdom association with American policy was more o f a
hindrance to their agendas then a benefit to their security.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91

Great Britain was in the most precarious position over Vietnam. England had the
largest military capabilities to contribute to South Vietnam, had the most to gain from
American Cold War policy, and had only a minor diplomatic tie to the conflict which
could prohibit a military contribution. London was, however, on the verge of economic
collapse, in great need o f re-building economic relationships with European countries that
opposed the war, and faced growing internal protest against American actions in
Vietnam. Prime Minister Wilson’s ultimate goal was to preserve Britain’s ties with the
United States and its standing in the international community while placating the Labour
Left which believed American policy in Vietnam was wrong and urged the
Commonwealth to distance itself from the war. Wilson pacified the Left by refusing to
send troops and attempted to mollify America by acting as a mediator.

Wilson’s

decision to intervene in the peace process may have been only a means of maintaining
favor with the Johnson administration and a mechanism to reinsert England into détente
diplomacy by mediating an end to the war. By accomplishing this, England would regain
its status as a Cold War arbitrator. Not until after 1967 and the failure of Wilson’s
mediation did the British Government recognize that it could never maintain American
favor without capitulating to Johnson’s will. The frustration led Britain to publicly
dissociate itself from American policy and withdraw from the peace process.
The more flags campaign highlighted the already shifting relationship between
America and Britain. While agreeing to assist diplomatically in an attempt to assuage
U.S. pressures, London was more concerned with not being too closely associated with
American policy and thereby alienating the international, especially European,
Chris Wrigley, “N ow You See It, Now You Don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s Foreign Policy 196470,” in The Wilson Government 1964-197. ed. R Loopey & S. Fielding (London: Printer Publishers, 1993),
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community. Had the United Kingdom not been applying for membership into the
European Economic Community, for both its economic and security benefits, there may
have been a greater willingness to assist the United States in its endeavor. Washington
continued its war policy without its most significant western allies because, militarily,
there was no need. What Johnson needed most from the British was public support to
help quell US domestic opposition rather than any economic or military assistance that
the smaller nation could provide.
Canada was in the least precarious situation. Its membership in the International
Control Commission precluded any military involvement in Vietnam. This was very clear
to the Johnson administration and relieved Ottawa of much o f the pressure that other
nations experienced. Prime Minister Pearson still felt that Canada had to provide some
support for her neighbor’s actions and did so through diplomatic means. The Seaborn
mission did help Canada to establish its own diplomatic utility, separate from Britain and
the Commonwealth. Unfortunately for Washington, whose campaign was designed to
gain public support for the war, most of the Canadian contributions could not be made
public. The government did provide substantial economic assistance to South Vietnam
and agreed to become a member of the International Commission for Supervision and
Control (ICSC) which was set up to implement the new peace agreement in 1973.
Canada’s experience in Vietnam made little difference in its relationship with the United
States. The positive results coming from Ottawa’s willingness to transmit messages
through the ICC were countered by opposition expressed by the populace and many
members of the government.
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Of the Commonwealth nations, only Australia, along with a token force from New
Zealand, committed troops to South Vietnam. Theirs was a choice necessitated by
security needs and was the result of years of encouraging the United States to take a
greater interest in the region. Washington considered Canberra’s commitment one of the
more flags campaign’s successes, yet it was Australia which spent far more time
encouraging the Americans to increase involvement in South Vietnam. Unlike the other
Commonwealth nations, Australia had a vested interest in seeing the Americans
committed to the region and was therefore far more likely to respond to the campaign.
Australia’s contribution had little effect on the outcome of the conflict. While its
troops were quite effective soldiers, Australia only committed three battalions by the end
of 1966. Thus the Americans and South Vietnamese continued to do the bulk o f the
fighting. Canberra’s involvement also yielded mixed results. By being one o f the few
mid-level powers to support the United States, Australia greatly improved its relationship
with Washington but in so doing, entangled itself in a an un-winnable situation that led to
internal political dissent. By the time Australia’s six-year participation ended in 1971,
four governments had been voted from office and the public support for the war had
turned to protest.
Ultimately, Vietnam created a closer relationship between Australia and the United
States only to have the domestic Australian opposition to the war, which developed out of
that involvement, tear the relationship apart. The willingness of Australia to act in
conjunction with the United States against the communism did establish a closer
relationship that would be called upon again in the future. Most importantly, Australia’s
Vietnam experience showed the ever increasing divide between Canberra and London.
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Where, as a Commonwealth member, Australia had always turned to the United
Kingdom to ensure its geopolitical security, now it would rely on the United States.
The more flags campaign also exacerbated the President Johnson’s strained
relationship with the Commonwealth leaders. Johnson took the lack o f positive response
from the British and Canadian Prime Ministers as a personal affront. A great rift
developed between the President and British Prime Minister Wilson whom Johnson
believed was untrustworthy and whom he continually confronted over his lack of
assistance. As early as 1965 the two argued over Wilson’s refusal to send troops to
Vietnam. Johnson believed that Wilson had no right to become involved in any peace
process if he were unwilling to participate in the fight. Wilson, in turn, felt he had no
choice in not sending troops given his domestic situation and believed that he and Britain
could still be effective mediators if the Americans kept them in the information loop.
This led to increasing tension at meetings between Wilson and the President.
The relationship between the President and Canadian Prime Minister Pearson also
suffered under the strain. After the Prime Minister made his April 1965 Temple
University speech in which he mildly criticized U.S. policy, the President summoned
Pearson to Camp David where he berated the Prime Minister for not showing proper
support for American actions. Pearson was less offended by the President’s tirade than
other leaders. He seemed to understand Johnson’s distress when he said of the President
following his meeting at Camp David, “he is more worried about US policy in Vietnam
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than he is willing to show. His irritation at any indication of lack of full support for his
policy... really indicate a feeling of insecurity about the situation.”'^®
It was this insecurity in the face of increasing international and domestic opposition
that led the Johnson administration to pursue more flags. The more flags campaign failed.
The results exposed growing divisions within the Commonwealth and a realignment of
security alliances between the United States and her traditional allies, but had minimal
practical results in gaining military assistance for American objectives in Southeast Asia.
Johnson in effect cast aside any real search for an international policy in Vietnam in favor
o f a unilateral, interventionist approach. With only minimal support from Australia, the
United States slowly abandoned the policy by mid-1966. Washington chose instead to
pursue its war policy without a coalition of Commonwealth support and eventually
received open criticism from all the members, including its only ally, Australia. The
Vietnam War also contributed to a re-alignment within the Commonwealth itself. Britain
turned toward Europe, Australia moved closer to their American ally, and Canada chose
to pursue an independent path. Both US overtures and Commonwealth responses
illustrated the uncertain and shifting nature of alliance building and its collapse in the
absence of true mutual security and economic interest.
The failure o f the more flags campaign also held consequences for President Johnson.
The lack of open support that the Johnson administration found in its allies greatly
troubled the President. The opposition both at home and abroad prompted the Johnson
not to seek a second term and left the President feeling more isolated. As he told Prime
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Minister Pearson in the spring of 1965, “Fm beginning to feel like a martyr,
misunderstood and misjudged by friends.”'^'
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